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Torts
by Cynthia Trimboli Adams*
and
Charles I. Adams
**
Who can be wise, amazed, temperate and furious,
Loyal and neutral, in a moment? No man.'

Macbeth may have feigned this plight as he covered up his foul
murder of King Duncan, but it precisely describes the survey writer's

dilemma. Some of the legal theories advanced in survey period cases
were as arcane as the contents of the witches' cauldron. 2 Some of the
holdings were as unsettling as Banquo's ghost at the feast? And, as

always, the accumulation of cases was as inexorable as Birnam Wood's
advance to Dunsinane.4 In our endeavor to carve out the decisions of

significance, we have perforce wielded a hand as bloody as that of the
evil Lady Macbeth herself.' If the result is less than Shakespearean,
perhaps the reader will yet find enough drama herein to refrain from
according it Macbeth's own grim self-epitaph: "[Ilt is a tale/Told by an
idiot, full of sound and fury/Signifying nothing."'

* Assistant Solicitor, State Court of Houston County, Georgia. Of Counsel to the firm
of Adams & Adams, Fort Valley and Macon, Georgia. Oxford College of Emory University
(A.A. 1977); Emory University (B.A., MA., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., cum laude,
1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Adams & Adams, Fort Valley and Macon, Georgia. Adjunct
Professor, Mercer University School of Law. University of Georgia; Mercer University
(BA., 1980; J.D. cum laude, 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. William Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 2, sc. 3 (Signet Classic ed., Signet Books 1963)
(1606).
2. Id. act 4, sc. 1.
3. Id. act 3, sc. 4.
4. Id. act 5, sc. 6.
5. Id.act5, sc. 1.
6. Id. act 5, sc. 5.
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INTENTIONAL TORTS

Sexual Harassment

In Mathews v. Anderson,' a federal district court stated without
explanation or citation of authority that "[pllaintiff's assertion that
Georgia recognizes the tort of sexual harassment is incorrect."'
Although no Georgia case has explicitly addressed the viability of such
a cause of action,9 a number of decisions have implictly allowed it.1"
For example, in Troutman v. B.C.B. Co., the court of appeals denied
a punitive damages claim against an employer of a man accused of
sexual harassment, but did so in language that "assum[ed] ...

that the

[employer] should have known about [the employee's] reputation for
sexual harassment ... ."' Also, in Collins v. DOT,' the en banc
court of appeals recognized that Georgia superior courts have nisi prius
jurisdiction over sexual harassment claims brought pursuant to federal
law ("Title VII"). 4 The court allowed plaintiff in that case to add the
Title VII claim to her original action 5 "seeking damages in tort for
sexual harassment.""'

7. 826 F. Supp. 479 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
8. Id. at 481.
9. In 1989, these writers made the following observation and prediction: "It should
be noted... that all ofthe cases authorizing sexual harassment claims have been squarely
bottomed on some type of assault or battery theory.... It might be possible, though, to
predicate a claim on some theory of mental abuse, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress." CHARLES R. ADAMS III & CYNTHIA TRIMBOLI ADAMS, GEORGIA LAW
OF TORTS § 2-3, at 20 (1989 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter "GEORGIA TORTS"J. That prediction
appears to have been fulfilled in Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 260, 414 S.E.2d
243 (1991), in which the court categorized the work-related sexual harassment of plaintiff
as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
10. See, e.g., Newsome v. Cooper-Wiss, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 670,672,374 S.E.2d 619,621
(1986); Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 888, 303 S.E.2d 71, 73, affid, 251 Ga. 491, 307
S.E.2d 474 (1983).
11. 209 Ga. App. 166, 433 S.E.2d 73 (1993).
12. Id. at 168, 433 S.E.2d at 75. Cf Rogers v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 211 Ga. App.
427,436 S.E.2d 663 (1993); Harvey v. McLaughlin, 198 Ga. App. 105, 107,400 S.E.2d 635,
636 (1990) (cause of action exists against employer for negligent retention of sexually
harassive employee).
13. 208 Ga. App. 53, 429 S.E.2d 707 (1993).
14. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
15. 208 Ga. App. at 55, 429 S.E.2d at 709.
16. Id. at 53, 429 S.E.2d at 707.
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From the existing authorities, therefore, ample warrant appears for*
maintaining a common-law tort claim for sexual harassment in Georgia.
It would, however, be helpful if the appellate courts would clarify the
exact parameters of this tort in an appropriate case.
B.

Conversion
Once again, the court of appeals resisted the siren call to expand the
tort of conversion,' this time to include intangible property interests.
In Southern Cellular Telecom, Inc. v. Banks,"8 plaintiff asked the court
to extend the Georgia law of conversion to hold that her minority
interest in a corporation was subject to a conversion claim.1" "We are
not persuaded by [plaintiff's] argument," said the court.' "Conversion
is not available as a cause of action with respect to intangible property
representing an interest in a business."2 '
How can Banks be reconciled with another recent decision, Faircloth
v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc.?' In that case, which is discussed
in last year's survey,23 the court of appeals stated that
It would seem that the gist of the tort is an act of hostile dominion or
appropriation, and is not merely a matter of whether the property
appropriated was tangible or intangible. The line is very fuzzy in
modern times. Today, many forms of property may be evidenced only
by a notation in a computer, but it is property nevertheless.'
Concluding that the sales commissions at issue in the case were not
subject to a conversion claim, the court in Williams adhered to "the
present rule that conversion involves chattels, not failure to pay money
owed under a contract ....

.'2

Perhaps the two cases can be reconciled

if there is no such thing as an "intangible chattel." Is there?

17. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 2-7, at 16 (Supp. 1994).
18. 208 Ga. App. 286, 431 S.E.2d 115 (1993).
19. 208 Ga. App. at 290, 431 S.E.2d at 120.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. .206 Ga. App. 764, 426 S.E.2d 601 (1992).
23. Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, 45 MERCER L. REv. 403, 405-06 (1993).
24. 206 Ga. App. at 767, 426 S.E.2d at 605.
25. Id. at 768, 426 S.E.2d at 605. Accord, Moore v. Barge, 210 Ga. App. 552, 436
S.E.2d 746 (1993) (conversion does not lie for failure to pay money due under a contract,
only for specific bills or notes to which plaintiff claims title).
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NEGLIGENCE

PremisesLiability.

In General. In Lipham v. FederatedDepartmentStores, Inc.,' the
supreme court confirmed the distinction the court of appeals recognized
earlier in Wade v. Mitchell' between premises liability cases involving
a static condition on the premises and cases involving the defendant's
active negligence." In Lipham plaintiff went to the parking lot of the
mall in which defendant's store was located to take her usual morning
constitutional. She was not there as a customer. Plaintiff detoured from
her walk to observe a defendant-sponsored competition game that was
taking place in a roped-off area of the mall parking lot, and stood
directly behind a male employee of defendant who was participating in
the event. The employee, unaware of plaintiff's presence, turned around
very quickly, and unintentionally knocked plaintiff to the ground.'
Reversing a divided court of appeals,' the supreme court held that
plaintiff's status on the property as a licensee or invitee "is irrelevant
and does nothing to diminish [defendant's] general duty of care towards
[plaintiff)."s

Premises liability in some instances is regulated by statute. For
example, in the Recreational Property Act ("RPA7),m the legislature
limited the liability of the owners of recreational property who make the

26. 263 Ga. 865, 440 S.E.2d 193 (1994).
27. 206 Ga. App. 265, 424 S.E.2d 810 (1992). Wade was discussed in last year's torts
survey article. See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note 23, at 409.
28. 263 Ga. at 865, 440 S.E.2d at 194.
29. Lipham v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 385,385,430 S.E.2d 590, 591
(1993), rev'd, 263 Ga. 865, 440 S.E.2d 193 (1994).
30. 263 Ga. at 866, 440 S.E.2d at 194.
31. 263 Ga. at 865-66, 440 S.E.2d at 194. Cf Georgia Ports Auth. v. Hutchinson, 209
Ga. App. 726, 434 S.E.2d 791 (1993) (defendant's position that plaintiff had superior
knowledge of alleged defect in crane which injured him (a premises liability argument)
inconsistant with defendant's position that its system of hand signals was adequate to
overcome any defect). Status of entrants, however, does retain significance in premises
cases involving injury caused by or related to a condition on the premises. See, e.g., Pope
v. Workman, 211 Ga. App. 263, 439 S.E.2d 86 (1993); Riley v. Brasunas, 210 Ga. App. 865,
438 S.E.2d 113 (1993) (lesser duty owed to social guests who are mere licensees); Wilbanks
v. Echols, 209 Ga. App. 210, 433 S.E.2d 134 (1993) (regardless of plaintiff fireman's status,
jury question existed on defendant's liability for failure to cover hole into which plaintiff
fell while crossing defendant's premises to fight fire).
32. O.C.GA § 51-3-2 (1982).

1994]

TORTS

469

property available to the public for recreational purposes at no
charge.'" Such a property is the somewhat tarnished (from overuse)
crown jewel of Georgia's Golden Isles, Jekyll Island. The Jekyll Island
State Park Authority maintains recreational facilities on Jekyll Island,
and charges persons arriving by automobile on the island a "parking fee"
upon entry. Plaintiff in Majeske v. Jekyll Island State Park Authority,' a vacationer on Jekyll Island, was injured when she stepped off a
footwalk bridge maintained by the Island Authority." She contended
the one dollar "parking fee" was in reality an admission charge, and the
RPA should not apply. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed
summary judgment for defendant." Because the fee was charged per
vehicle, regardless of the number of occupants, and no fee was charged
for anyone entering the island by other means, it was not imposed in
return for the recreational use of the land; and the RPA's immunity
applied.7
Sometimes plaintiffs seek to hold defendants liable seemingly on the
strength of nothing more than their mere ownership of premises. Courts
typically rebuff such attempts, holding that "[tihe duty imposed [on a
landowner] is to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable injury,
not to protect against any injury."
Thus, during the survey period,
the courts turned away attempts to impose liability on landowners for
an adult drowning3 9 or becoming paralyzed' in a swimming pool, for
injuries to a contractor's invitee during surrender of the premises to the
contractor,41 and for injuries sustained by a falling gutter when the end
that fell was attached to another building over which the landowner had
no control.42
The question sometimes turns on what duties, if any, the landowner
has assumed toward the premises in question. This arises frequently in
analyzing the landowner's statutory duty to "keep the premises and

33. Id. § 51-3-20.
34. 209 Ga. App. 118, 433 S.E.2d 304 (1993).
35. Id. at 119, 433 S.E.2d at 305.
36. Id. at 120, 433 S.E.2d at 306.
37. Id. Accord, Spivey v. City of Baxley, 210 Ga. App. 772, 437 S.E.2d 623 (1993) (fee
required for participation in church softball league had no relation to permission to enter
spectator seating area; RPA applied to injured spectator who was charged nothing to
attend the game).
38. Belcher v. James, 207 Ga. App. 796, 796, 429 S.E.2d 165, 166 (1993) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151, 155, 289 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1982)).
39. Belcher, 207 Ga. App. 796, 429 S.E.2d 165 (1993).
40. Pope v. Workman, 211 Ga.App. 263, 439 S.E.2d 86 (1993).
41. Braswell v. Walton, 208 Ga. App. 610, 431 S.E.2d 417 (1993).
42. Milford v. Wilson, 210 Ga. App. 338, 436 S.E.2d 38 (1993).
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approaches safe."' If the owner has not exercised or assumed any
rights in the "approach" greater than or different from those exercised
by the public at large, he will typically not have any greater duty
therein." What constitutes an "approach" occupied a divided supreme
court in yet another Jekyll Island case, Motel Properties, Inc. v.
Miller.' Reversing the court of appeals decision discussed in last
year's survey,' the high court decided four to three that the rip-rap
bordering the Jekyll beach did not constitute an "approach" to defendant's Comfort Inn, even though defendant had a sidewalk that extended
200 feet out from its hotel, across state property, and stopped only 27
feet short of the boulders.47 Plaintiff, a hotel guest who was unfamiliar
with the beach at Jekyll Island, decided to go for a night-time stroll on
the beach. He walked to the end of defendant's sidewalk, continued on
across the sand, and was injured when he fell on the boulders. It was
undisputed that defendant provided no illumination or warnings about
the presence of the boulders.'"
The court of appeals, relying on Todd v. FW. Woolworth Co.,4' found
the existence of a jury question based on defendant's right and obligation
to illuminate the boulders or at least to post a warning signY° The
supreme court stated that "[wle were not called upon in Todd to address
the issue present in this case, i.e., what physically constitutes an
approach ...

."5'

The supreme court proceded to "construe 'approa-

ches' to mean that property directly contiguous, adjacent to, and
touching those entryways to premises under the control of an owner or
By 'contiguous, adjacent to, and touching,' we mean that
occupier ....
property within the last few steps taken by invitees... as they enter or
exit the premises. 2 Of course, as the court recognized, the owner can
enlarge the approaches "by some positive action on his part, such as
constructing a sidewalk, ramp, or other direct approach,"' but that was
43. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (1982) (emphasis added).
44. See Zumbado v. Lincoln Property Co., 209 Ga. App. 163, 433 S.E.2d 301 (1993).
45. 263 Ga. 484, 436 S.E.2d 196 (1993).
46. Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 206 Ga. App. 370,425 S.E.2d 334 (1992), reu'd,263
Ga. 484, 436 S.E.2d 196 (1993). See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note 23,
at 411.
47. 263 Ga. at 484, 436 S.E.2d at 197.
48. Id. at 485, 436 S.E.2d at 197.
49. 258 Ga. 194, 366 S.E.2d 674 (1988).
50. 206 Ga. App. 372, 372, 425 S.E.2d 335, 335 (1992) rev'd, 263 Ga. 484, 436 S.E.2d

196 (1993).
51. 263 Ga. at 485, 436 S.E.2d at 197-98.
52. Id. at 486, 436 S.E.2d at 198.
53. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Elmore, Inc. v. Porcher, 124 Ga. App. 418,420; 183
S.E.2d 923, 925 (1971)).

1 ,

'
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not the case here. Accordingly, said the court, this was "at best... an
approach to an approach,"" and defendant, therefore, was not liable.
Presiding Justice Hunt's cogent dissent argued the definition of
"approach" should not turn on a "measurement of physical distance," but,
as in Tbdd, on "the nature of the owner's relationship to the approach
and rights in that approach; implicit in these considerations is the
relationship between the business, the approach and the invitee's reason
for using the approach."' Part of what defendant's invitees pay for is
access to the beach, and defendant provided the walk solely for that
purpose. Thus, distance is irrelevant, because "one who leaves the motel
on this path can have only one destination .... "' Appropriately,
Judge Cloud Morgan's dissent "express[es] sympathy for the trial judges
of this state who may be called upon at some future date to apply th[isl
rule . .... 7
Several recent decisions found the existence of a jury issue on the
question of the owner's liability. Regardless of the tenant's equal
knowledge, when a premises-related danger exists in violation of
applicable housing codes, a jury question exists concerning the landlord's
liability, such as for the absent stair rail in Bastien v. MetropolitanPark
Lake Associates, L.P.," or the inadequate fire exits in Windermere, Ltd.
v. Bettes. 59 Furthermore, a proprietor may have a duty to intervene
to prevent injury to its invitees, such as the third-party criminal attack
sustained by plaintiff in Good 01' Days Downtown, Inc. v. Yancey.'
Plaintiff had a bad ol' night when he was struck in the face with a pool
cue for not acting speedily enough to buy the third party a beer. A jury
question existed, in view of plaintiff's assertion that "the employees of
[defendant] had sufficient time to react to his attacker's loud and
abusive behavior which continued for over five minutes within hearing
distance of the waitresses and bartenders."0 '

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 487, 436 S.E.2d at 199.
263 Ga. at 487, 436 S.E.2d at 199 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 488, 436 S.E.2d at 200.
263 Ga. at 489, 436 S.E.2d at 200 (Cloud Morgan, J. (sitting by designation),

dissenting).
58. 209 Ga. App. 881, 434 S.E.2d 736 (1993).
59. 211 Ga. App. 177, 438 S.E.2d 406 (1993).
60. 209 Ga. App. 696, 434 S.E.2d 740 (1993).
61. Id. at 698, 434 S.E.2d at 742. Compare Yancey with Collins v. Shepherd, 212 Ga.
App. 54, 441 S.E.2d 458 (1994) (physical precedent only), in which plaintiff was injured in
a brawl at the notorious Whiskey River nightclub in Macon, Georgia. The court held that,
although defendant did have a duty to guard its patrons against criminal activity, the

security measures it provided were adequate. Id. at 56, 441 S.E.2d at 459. See also
Anderson v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 834 F. Supp. 1364, 1371-72 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (proprietor
that voluntarily undertakes security measures may be held liable if it "acts unreasonably
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Slip and Fail. Over the years, the courts have quite deliberately
stacked the legal deck against plaintiffs in that specialized branch of

premises liability known as 'slip and fall' cases. 2 The result is that
each year the few meritorious claims get lost in a flood of summary
judgments for defendants. For example, during the survey period the

courts denied recovery to plaintiffs who took their chances by walking
on obviously slick surfaces,' clearly uneven pavement," and by
deliberately stepping into holes" or water puddles."
One theory slip and fall plaintiffs frequently try and fail on is the
"distraction" theory, which covers "situations where the plaintiff's
attention is distracted by a natural and usual cause, and this is
particularly true where the distraction is placed there by the defendant
or where the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care should have
anticipated the distraction would occur." 7 In this regard, plaintiffs
frequently contend they were distracted by defendant's merchandise.
However, "a product on store shelves does not in itself constitute a
distraction."
"To say otherwise would permit customers to barge

heedlessly around a store looking at the merchandise,... with no care
for their own safety and the safety of others." Sometimes it works,
0
there was evidence
though. In Thompson v. Regency Mall Associates,"
plaintiff was distracted by one defendant's retail display just a few feet
away from the defective carpet molding she tripped on. 7 ' Furthermore,
defendants failed to present evidence of regular inspection procedures,

or makes the situation worse, by increasing the danger, or by misleading the plaintiff into
belief that [the danger] has been removed, or by depriving the plaintiff of the possibility
of help from other sources.... .") (quoting Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 495 n.2, 405
S.E.2d 474, 478 n.2 (1991)).
62. See generally GEORGIA ToRTS, supra note 9, § 4-6.
63. Pitterson v. First Assembly of God, 211 Ga. App. 718,440 S.E.2d 492(1994); Caven
v. Warehouse Home Furnishings Distribs., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 706, 434 S.E.2d 532 (1993);
Walker, Dade & Catoosa Counties Hosp. Auth. v. Clark, 209 Ga. App. 52, 432 S.E.2d 647
(1993) (physical precedent only); Spann v. Calhoun County Hosp. Auth., 208 Ga. App. 494,
430 S.E.2d 828 (1993).
64. Huntley Jiffy Stores, Inc. v. Grigsby, 208 Ga. App. 634, 431 S.E.2d 435 (1993).
65. Dunn v. Gourmet, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 826, 429 S.E.2d 282 (1993).
66. Bloch v. Herman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 280, 430 S.E.2d 86 (1993).
67. Ramirez v. Kroger Co., 207 Ga. App. 830,830,429 S.E.2d 311,313 (1993) (en banc)
(no jury question; distraction self-induced).
68. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Carroll, 212 Ga. App. 234, 234, 441 S.E.2d 432, 433
(1994). Accord, Foodmax, Inc. v. Terry, 210 Ga. App. 511, 436 S.E.2d 725 (1993).
69. Minor v. Super Discount Markets, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 123, 124, 438 S.E.2d 384, 385
(1993).
70. 209 Ga. App. 1, 432 S.E.2d 230 (1993).
71. Id. at 2, 432 S.E.2d at 232.
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which can be fatal to a motion for summary judgment in this type of
case.7 2 Likewise, the Georgia Court of Appeals has repeatedly held
that "[wihen a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous
condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have
knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting
therefrom."7 3 Yet, in a federal case, Evans v. Mathis Funeral Home,
Inc.,7 the Eleventh Circuit found a jury question when plaintiff fell
down a flight of stairs she had ascended just a couple of hours earlier.7"
That court suggested the rule quoted above applies only when one of
three factors is present: (1) The plaintiff traversed the area "only
moments before falling"; (2) the plaintiff was repeatedly exposed to the
hazardous condition; or (3) the hazardous condition was static.7" The
court found none of these three conditions were present in the instant
case, and based its decision also in part on the irregular construction of
the stairs as testified to by plaintiff's expert.77
Philosophically speaking, what does the demand reflected by all of
these claims indicate about the supply of justice? Are there too many
frivolous claims in the area of premises liability, or is the legal standard
too high? Remember that judges are the government; jurors are the free
market, and socialism has failed everywhere it has ever been tried.
C.

Malpractice

In General. The expert witness affidavit requirement of Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-11-9.1' s continues to

72. Id. at 3-4,432 S.E.2d at 232-33. Compare Crocker v. Douglas County, 212 Ga. App.
219, 441 S.E.2d 515 (1994), and Burke v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 115, 441 S.E.2d 429
(1994) (jury question presented because of defendant's failure to establish regular
inspection procedures) with Foodmax, Inc. v. Terry, 210 Ga. App. 511, 436 S.E.2d 725
(1993) (defendant inspected five minutes previously); Moore v. Food Assocs., Inc., 210 Ga.
App. 780, 437 S.E.2d 832 (1993) (15 minutes); A.B.C. Drug Co. v. Sweat, 209 Ga. App. 25,
432 S.E.2d 627 (1993) (same); J.H. Harvey Co. v. Johnson, 211 Ga. App. 809, 440 S.E.2d
548 (1994) (30 minutes), and Horn v. Foodmax, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 506, 437 S.E.2d 336
(1993) (floors inspected every three to four hours).
73. Wiley v. Family Dollar Store, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 461, 462, 430 S.E.2d 839, 840
(1993) (quoting Rose v. Kennesaw House, 203 Ga. App. 648, 649, 417 S.E.2d 379, 380-81
(1992)). Accord, Souder v. Atlanta Family Restaurants, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 291, 435 S.E.2d
764 (1993); Lea v. American Home Equities, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 214,435 S.E.2d 734 (1993).
74. 996 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 270.
76. Id. at 269-70.
77. Id. at 269. Cf Wilson v. Duncan, 211 Ga. App. 814, 440 S.E.2d 550 (1994) (uneven
floor levels; defendant not liable).
78. O.CG.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993).
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overshadow all other events on the malpractice scene. This hypertechnical legal anomaly has been criticized by these writers,"9 and has also
begun to draw some judicial fire because of its continuing capacity for
confusion.s' Predictably, the issues presented for appellate resolution
under section 9.1 during the survey period ran the gamut from the
serious to the absurd. The courts added another chapter to the
continually unfolding drama of just who is a "professional" entitled to
invoke the protections of section 9.1. Previously, in Gillis v. Goodgame,"' the supreme court held that because the only statutory
definitions of a "professional" are found in Code sections 14-7-2 (part of
the Georgia Professional Corporation Act);82 14-10-2 (part of the
Georgia Professional Association Act);ss and 43-1-24 which refers to
"[any person licensed by a state examining board" and who practices
one of the professions covered by those two Acts, s" section 9.1 protection
was limited only, to the occupations covered by those Code sections.ss
By extending section 9.1 protection to all occupations "licensed by a state
examining board," the court in Gillis expanded the scope of that statute
far beyond any legitimate notion of "professional," with the anomalous
result that section 9.1 covered many patently nonprofessional occupations--"athletic trainers, barbers, operators of billiard parlors, junk
dealers, peddlers, scrap metal processors, and used car dealers, among
others," -but omitted other occupations that clearly were "professions"

79. See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note 23, at 418 ("Ihe Code
section is a useless, self-defeating mess.").
80. See Tye v. Wilson, 208 Ga. App. 253, 256-57, 430 S.E.2d 129, 132 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
81. 262 Ga. 117, 414 S.E.2d 197 (1992).
82. O.C.G.A. § 14-7-2(2) (1994).

83. Id. § 14-10-2(2).
84. Id. § 43-1-24 (1991).,
85. 262 Ga. at 118, 414 S.E.2d at 198. Applying Gillis, the court of appeals in Legum
v. Couch, 208 Ga. App. 185, 186, 430 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1993), held that when a plaintiff

seeks to hold an institution or entity liable for the negligence of its employees, the
applicability of O.C.GA § 9-11-9.1 turns on whether an affidavit would be required against
the negligent employee. Thus, the court held that, although the affidavit requirement does

not automatically apply to any claim asserted against a hospital, if the claim is grounded'
on "acts or omissions requiring the exercise of professional skill and judgment by agents
or employees who themselves are recognized as 'professionals,'" an affidavit is required.
Id. at 186-87,430 S.E.2d at 363. Accord, Hodo v. General Hosps. of Humana, Inc., 211 Ga.
App. 6, 438 S.E.2d 378 (1993); DOT v. Gilmore, 209 Ga. App. 656, 434 S.E.2d 114(1993).
86.

Cynthia Trimboi Adams, et al., Torts, 42 MERCER L. REv. 431,441 (1991) (footnote

omitted).
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but did not appear on one of Gillis' three statutory lists.87 Among these
are the clergy (a "learned profession" at common law"), teachers,
insurance agents, 9 and, perhaps the most glaring omission for malpractice purposes, pharmacists." In Harrell v. Lusk, 9 the supreme
court in a dicta-laden opinion deconstructed at least a portion of the
Gillis framework and assayed a different analysis of the definition of
"professional" for section 9.1 purposes.' The result, like most attempts
at judicial legislation, was to make the situation worse than before.
Harrell was a malpractice action against a pharmacist. Defendant

argued plaintiff had not attached a proper expert affidavit to her
complaint, and section 9.1 consequently barred the action.93 The court
of appeals ruled no affidavit was required, because pharmacists were not

among those professions protected by section 9.1 according to Gillis.94
The supreme court, in a judicial double take, held that "[a]n extensive
review of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated reveals that pharmacy,
with its education-qualified licensing and state examining board
regulation, is the only profession declared to be such by the legislature

that is not included in Title 43.95 Consequently, the court "[found] it
necessary to augment the list of professions set forth in Gillis"to include
pharmacists. In doing so, the court made a distinction

87. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, a "profession" is
A vocation or occupation requiring special, usually advanced, education and skill;
The term originally contemplated only
e.g. law or medical professions ....
theology, law, and medicine, but as applications of science and learning are
extended to other departments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name,
which implies professed attainments in special knowledge as distinguished from
mere skill.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1089-90 (5th ed. 1979). "In all interpretations of statutes, the
ordinary signification shall be applied to all words.... " O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1 (1990). Thus,
as Justice Carley's concurrence in Harrell v. Lusk, 263 Ga. 895, 898-904, 439 S.E.2d 896,
899-902 (1994), discussed infra note 110 and accompanying text, points out, the whole
premise of Gillis is flawed.
88. See supra note 87. See generally Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al. Torts, 44 MERCER
L. REV. 375, 386 & nn. 124-25 (1992).
89. See Creel v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 260 Ga. 499, 397 S.E.2d 294 (1990). But
see Moseley v. Coastal Plains Gin Co., 199 Ga. App. 99, 101-03, 404 S.E.2d 123, 126-27
(1991) (discussing standard of care applicable to insurance agents as "experts").
90. See Harrell v. Lusk, 208 Ga. App. 358,430 S.E.2d 653 (1993) affd on othergrounds,
263 Ga. 895, 439 S.E.2d 896 (1994).
91. 263 Ga. 895, 439 S.E.2d 896 (1994).
92. Id. at 896-97, 439 S.E.2d at 897-98.
93. Id. at 895, 439 S.E.2d at 897.
94. See Harrell,208 Ga. App. at 360, 430 S.E.2d at 655.
95. 263 Ga. at 897, 439 S.E.2d at 898 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
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between those occupations included in Title 43 where licensure involves
merely registration, e.g., firearm dealers...; operators of motor vehicle
racetracks... ; peddlers...; and used motor vehicle parts dealers,....
and those occupations where licensure is conditioned upon the state
examining board's determination that the applicant successfully
completed the schooling and/or training upon which licensure is
statutorily preconditioned.
In dicta, the court remarked that its nascent section 9.1 analysis would
not extend to putative professionals such as teachers, court reporters,

and fire fighters.98 Admitting, however, that the state of the law at the
time plaintiff filed her complaint was "unclear," the court held it would
be "manifestly unfair" to apply this newfound analysis to the instant
case."
Consequently, as it has done before,"' ° the court made its
decision prospective, and affirmed the court of appeals.1"'
How, in the wake of Harrell,does one determine who is a "profession-

al"? Concerning Title 43 occupations, that case apparently intended to
limit the rule to "those occupations where licensure is conditioned upon
the state examining board's determination that the applicant successfully completed the schooling and/or training upon which licensure is
statutorily preconditioned. " 1°2 Space does not permit a comprehensive
analysis of all the Title 43 occupations, so one random example will have
to suffice. Chapter 10 of Title 43 deals with cosmetologists. 3 Accord-

97. Id. at 897 n.2, 439 S.E.2d at 898 n.2.
98. Id. at 897 n.3, 439 S.E.2d at 898 n.3.
99. 263 Ga. at 898, 439 S.E.2d at 899.
100. See, e.g., Lutz v. Fora, 262 Ga. 819, 427 S.E.2d 248 (1993); Kneip v. Southern.
Eng'g Co., 260 Ga. 409, 395 S.E.2d 809 (1990).
101. 263 Ga. at 898, 439 S.E.2d at 899. In Brown v. Nichols, 8 F.3d 770 (11th Cir.
1993), the Eleventh Circuit used the prospective application rule of Harrell, Lutz, and
Kneip to sidestep the issue of 'whether § 9.1 applies in federal diversity actions. Plaintiff
in Brown failed to file a § 9.1 affidavit with her complaint, and the district court dismissed
her action with prejudice. 8 F.3d at 771. Both the Northern District of Georgia
(McGlamery v. Bruttomesso, No. 1:88-CV-787-FCF (N.D. Ga. June 16, 1989)), and the
Southern District of Georgia (Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. Ga. 1990)), have held
that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 does not apply in federal court. The Eleventh Circuit adverted to
Lutz and Kniep to hold that because the applicability of § 9.1 in federal court was unclear,
the district court, upon determining that it applied, should have granted plaintiff leave to
amend instead of dismissing with prejudice. "We therefore need not reach the question of
whether § 9-11-9.1 actually applies in federal court." "Either way, the district court erred.'
8 F.3d at 774.
Subsequently, another Northern District judge has declined to strike an O.C.G.A. § 9-119.1--based defense. See Cahela v. Bernard, 155 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
102. 263 Ga. at 897 n.2, 439 S.E.2d at 898 n.2.
103. O.C.G.A. § 43-10-1 (1991).
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ing to statute, a cosmetologist is one who, among other things, cuts or
shampoos the hair, or in any way cares for the nails of another
person.'" No one can practice cosmetology unless he has obtained a
certificate of registration from the State Board of Cosmetology. 10 5 The
state board is authorized "to set a course of study for all students of the
schools of cosmetology, schools of esthetics, and schools of nail care
within this state."1'6 Thus, a cosmetologist is a "professional" under
Harrell, and an action for wrongful manicure or negligent hot wax is
elevated to the status of a professional malpractice case. 10 7 This result
calls to mind Judge Arthur Gray Powell's famous observation that
"[pleople would laugh at the law if it required any such thing,"08 but
Harrell is no laughing matter for litigants on both sides who are still
faced with the anomalous result of expert testimony being statutorily
required at the pleading stage when, as in the case of a cosmetologist,
the common
law in all probability would not require it at the evidentiary
9
stage. 10
Justice Carley's concurrence aptly recognized that the very premise of
Harrell and Gillis is flawed. Rather than "accept[ing] the premise of
Gillis that the scope of the applicability of [section 9.1] is somehow
dependent upon a statutorydefinition of the term 'professional,'" Justice
Carley contended that "the legislative intent.., was to create an initial

104. Id. § 43-10-1(4), (6).
105. Id. § 43-10-8.

106. Id. § 43-10-13.
107. Cf Colston v. Fred's Pest Control, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 362, 436 S.E.2d 23 (1993)
(lihysical precedent only) (applying rationale of Gillis, court held that an O.C.G.A. § 9-119.1 affidavit is required in action against pest control operator).
108. Fletcher Guano Co. v. Vorus, 10 Ga. App. 380, 382, 73 S.E. 348, 349 (1912).
109. "[E]xpert opinions are required only concerning conclusions that the jury could not
draw for itself, that is, a conclusion, that is, beyond the ken of the average layman."
GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 5-1, at 46 (Supp. 1994).
Survey period cases that considered the difference between the pleading requirements
of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 testimony and the evidentiary requirements imposed at later stages
of the litigation included Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 442 S.E.2d 233 (1994) (O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-9.1 does not establish evidentiary standard regarding affiant's competency at
pleading stage; plaintiff may offer additional evidence of competency in response to
defendant's motion to dismiss); and Williams v. Hajosy, 210 Ga. App. 637, 436 S.E.2d 716
(1993) (affidavit insufficient to withstand summary judgment may nevertheless satisfy
pleading standards of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1). Although sworn or certified medical records
need not be attached to a § 9.1 affidavit, Bryant v. Crider, 209 Ga. App. 623, 434 S.E.2d
161 (1993), Williams and Hailey v. Blalock, 209 Ga. App. 345, 433 S.E.2d 337 (1993),
reiterated that a plaintiffs expert affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for summary
judgment must attach such records (or be based on the expert's personal knowledge, Paulin
v. Okehi, 211 Ga. App. 752, 440 S.E.2d 486 (1994)) in order to create a fact issue.
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pleading requirement, the applicability of which would be as broad as
the antecedent common law evidentiary requirement."110
This extensive discussion of Harrellperhaps illustrates the enormous
range and complexity of the issues generated by section 9.1. Only a few
additional highlights can be remarked.
The law of expert witness competency continues to evolve. In their
1989 survey article,"' these writers contrasted a case which held a
nurse was not qualified to refute an attending physician's statements, 112 with another holding a doctor was not a competent expert in
the field of nursing." During the current survey period, the court of
appeals executed an about-face on both of these issues. In 7ye v.
Wilson,14 the court held a doctor who was familiar with the standard
of care acceptable to the "medical profession generally"" could testify
against a nurse. "This court has consistently held that members of the
medical profession are competent to render an opinion about the
standard of care of other members of the medical profession as long as
Predictably,
their opinion concerns a common area of expertise.""
then, in Nowak v. High,"7 the court held a nurse could give an
affidavit against a doctor concerning a method of treatment which was
the same for both."
A final matter of importance in the area of section 9.1 merits
comment. Subsection (b) of that statute provides for an automatic fortyfive day extension for filing the affidavit if the statute of limitations will
expire within ten days of filing and the plaintiff alleges that, because of
time constraints, the affidavit could not be prepared." 9 This seemingly straightforward provision is fraught with perils, however, as several
survey period cases proved.

110. 263 Ga. at 902-03, 439 S.E.2d at 901 (Carley, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
111. See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, 41 MERcER L. REv. 355, 368 (1989).
112. See Chafin v. Wesley Homes, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 403, 404, 367 S.E.2d 236, 238
(1988).
113. See Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Milton, 189 Ga. App. 563, 564, 377 S.E.2d 198, 199
(1988).
114. 208 Ga. App. 253, 430 S.E.2d 129 (1993). Although 7!ye was discussed in last
year's survey, it is technically a part of this current survey period, which includes cases
published in the advance sheets between June 1, 1993 and May 31, 1994. See Cynthia
Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note 23, at 415, 418.
115. 208 Ga. App. at 254, 430 S.E.2d at 130 (emphasis omitted).
116. Id.
117. 209 Ga. App. 536, 433 S.E.2d 602 (1993).
118. Id. at 538, 433 S.E.2d at 604.
119. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b) (1993).
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In Legum v. Crouch,"2 the court of appeals held the statute of
limitations for plaintiff's medical malpractice claims was tolled during
the period her decedent's estate was unrepresented. 1 This aspect of
Legum is discussed elsewhere in this article, 1" but the court held that
because the tolling provisions kept the statute from expiring within ten
days of filing, as plaintiff had alleged, subsection (b) did not apply and
her affidavit, therefore, was not timely filed.0
Plaintiff in Coleman v. Hicks 24 also ran afoul of subsection 9.1(b).
In her legal malpractice complaint, she alleged defendants wrongfully
settled her underlying claim in January 1990. Although plaintiff filed
a State Bar complaint against defendants in March 1990, she contended
they misled and defrauded her about her case until May 1992 and,
consequently, the statute of limitations was tolled until then.125 Filing
the instant action in May 1990, plaintiff attempted to take advantage of
subsection 9.1(b), but the court of appeals rebuffed her. "In our view,"
said the court, "plaintiff's complaint sounds in both tort and contract.
After all, she seeks damages for pain and suffering, as well as damages
for monetary loss." ' This put plaintiff in a double bind, explained the

120. 208 Ga. App. 185, 430 S.E.2d 360 (1993).
121. Id. at 188-89, 430 S.E.2d at 364.
122. See infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
123. 208 Ga. App. at 189, 430 S.E.2d at 364.
124. 209 Ga. App. 467, 433 S.E.2d 621 (1993).
125. Id. at 467-68, 433 S.E.2d at 621-22.
126. Id. at 469, 433 S.E.2d at 623. By suggesting that legal malpractice has a basis in
contract, the court in Coleman perpetuated a seeming anomaly arising out of such cases
as Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 459, 346 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1986), and Cheeley v.
Henderson, 197 Ga. App. 543, 546-47, 398 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1990), rev'd on other grounds,
261 Ga. 498, 405 S.E.2d 865 (1991), that a malpractice cause of action alleging negligence
or unskillfulness can sound in contract or tort. Coleman, in fact, seemingly went one step
further in suggesting plaintiff's claim for monetary loss sounded in contract, and her claim
for personal injuries sounded in tort. All of these cases, however, ultimately rely on the
decision in Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 306 S.E.2d
340 (1983), affd, 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1984), which made it clear the duty to
exercise the requisite degree of care in the professional's discharge of his services is
a duty apart from any express contractual obligation. Therefore, persons of this
class performing services pursuant to their contracts with their clients have been
held to be liable in tort for their negligence in failing to exercise the required
degree of skill, and thus to be liable to a suit ex delicto [for the negligent
performance of the contract].
167 Ga. App. at 414, 306 S.E.2d at 342 (emphasis added). Thus, Coleman, and perhaps the
earlier cases as well, probably go too far in implying that a legal malpractice action for
monetary loss sounds only in contract. Such a loss, to the extent it is based on negligence,
is obviously a tort action, which is "only dependent upon the contract to the extent
necessary to raise the duty." Peterson v. First Clayton Bank & Trust Co., 214 Ga. App. 94,
98,447 S.E.2d 63,67 (1994) (quoting Mauldin v. Sheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874,878, 150 S.E.2d
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court, because "[to the extent [her] claim sounds in tort, it is barred by
the applicable two-year statute of limitation.""
Furthermore, added
the court, "t]o the extent [her] claim sounds in contract, it is not time
barred.""1 Thus, like plaintiff in Legum, Coleman's attempt to avail
herself of subsection 9.1(b) was improper.
Since section 9.1 litigation seems to have overtaken slip and fall cases
as the tort appeal of choice in Georgia, we terminate the survey of these
cases with an apt adaptation of a condign comment conflated by the
great Judge Braswell Deen:
Concerning slip and fall [and section 9.11 cases, we have read ...
"until [our] eyes have grown weak with reading and brain fagged out
with trying to understand what learned judge after learned judge and
learned law writer after learned law writer have said on these subjects.
'But the thought comes to us that one may live in sight of the ocean,
may sail upon it, may know its moods in the calm and in the storm,
and yet not be able to answer some simple question as to a cup of cold
water. He who so oft had studied with most critical and intelligent
eyes the profusion of flowers in which England's gardens and fields
abound confessed how little he knew of the "all in all" of the single and
insignificant flower which he plucked from the crannied wall.' "'
Medical Malpractice. Three essential elements comprise a cause
of action for medical malpractice:13 0 (1) the duty inherent in the
doctor-patient relationship;1" 1 (2) the breach of that duty by the failure
to apply the requisite degree of skill and care; 2 and (3) that failure

150, 154 (1966)). To the extent Coleman, Cheeley, and Ballard were concerned with
applying the four-year statute for breaches of oral contract (O.C.GA § 9-3-25 (1982)) to
plaintiffs' allegations of monetary loss, the same result could have been achieved by
recognizing the action was in tort and applying O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 (1982), the four-year
statute of limitations for tortious injury to property.
127. 209 Ga. App. at 469, 433 S.E.2d at 623.
128. Id. But see supra note 37. See also DOT v. Gilmore, 209 Ga. App. 656,434 S.E.2d
114 (1993) (plaintiff's invocation of O.C.GA § 9-11-9.1(b) automatically extends defendant's
time to answer by an equal period).
129. Hilsman v. Kroger Co., 187 Ga. App. 570,571,370 S.E.2d 755,756 (1988) (quoting
City of Atlanta v. Keiser, 50 Ga. App. 600, 601-02, 179 S.E. 192, 193 (1934)).
130. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 5-2, at 95.
131. Walker v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 209 Ga. App. 517, 524-25, 434 S.E.2d 63, 69-70
(1993) (en banc) is a reminder that this relationship can be established by circumstantial
evidence.
132. In McQuaig v. McLaughlin, 211 Ga. App. 723, 440 S.E.2d 499 (1994), plaintiffs
attempted to ask their expert what action he would have taken had he been caring for
plaintiff. Reiterating that "[t]he appropriate standard of care in medical malpractice cases
is the standard of care exercised in the medical profession generally, rather than a local
standard," the court held evidence concerning what the individual doctor would have done
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As
constituting the proximate cause of injury to the patient.'
Georgia Law of Torts points out, however, "[niot only physicians, but
dentists, chiropractors, psychiatrists, and others are subject to tort
liability for medical malpractice."184 During the survey period, the
court of appeals augmented that list with optometrists in Zechmann v.
Thigpen. 5' Code section 9 -3-70,"s the medical malpractice statute
of limitations, defines such an action in part as "arising out of: (1)
[hiealth, medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription,
treatment, or care rendered by a person authorized by law to perform
such service. . . ." Holding that "[this] language plainly encompasses more than the practice of medicine," the court reasoned that because
plaintiffs' contentions of injury "arose from the health or medical service,
diagnosis and/or care which the optometrist rendered to her," the action
was one for medical malpractice and was subject to the limitations
period of section 9-3-70.""
In a lengthy and thoughtful opinion, a divided court of appeals in
Walker v. Jack Eckerd Corp.'" addressed as a matter of first impression the common-law duty of pharmacists to warn patients about
potential adverse consequences of drugs prescribed by a licensed
physician. Discussing the two competing lines of authority on this
issue,14" the court adopted the majority view that "a pharmacist has

differently was inadmissible. Id. at 727, 440 S.E.2d at 503. Similarly, in Bieling v. Battle,
209 Ga. App. 874, 434 S.E.2d 719 (1993), the court held the standard of care must be based
on knowledge available to the general medical community at the time of the alleged
negligence. 209 Ga. App. at 878-79, 434 S.E.2d at 722-23. Thus, defendant's failure in
1982 to take measures to prevent plaintiff from contracting AIDS through a blood
transfusion was not negligent, because it was undisputed "the general medical community
could not have anticipated in 1982 that AIDS was a natural, foreseable risk associated with
a blood transfusion as such connection had not been made at the time and was not a part
of general medical knowledge." Id. at 878, 434 S.E.2d at 722-23.
133. The requisite causal connection may be severed by the unilateral act of the
plaintiffterminating the physician-patient relationship. Matthews v. DeKalb County Hosp.
Auth., 211 Ga. App. 858, 440 S.E.2d 743 (1994). There is also no proximate cause if
plaintiff's expert testimony fails to establish "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty"
that the alleged negligence caused the harm complained of. Goggin v. Goldman, 209 Ga.
App. 251, 253, 433 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1993).
134. GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 5-2, at 96 (footnotes omitted).
135. 210 Ga. App. 726, 437 S.E.2d 475 (1993).
136. Id. at 727, 437 S.E.2d at 477; see O.C.GA. § 9-3-70 (1982).
137. Id. § 9-3-70(1).
138. 210 Ga. App. at 727, 437 S.E.2d at 477.
139. 209 Ga. App. 517, 434 S.E.2d 63 (1993).
140. The court considered and rejected the "minority view" that a pharmacist does owe
a duty to warn. Id. at 521, 434 S.E.2d at 67 (citing Docken v. CIBA-GEIGY, 790 P.2d 45
(Or. App. 1990); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).
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no duty to warn the customer or notify the physician that the drug is
being prescribed in dangerous amounts, that the customer is being over
medicated, or that the various drugs in their prescribed quantities could
cause adverse reactions to the consumer."'
The court based its
holding on
the need for preserving, without interference of third parties, a trusted
physician-patient relationship, the fact that patients have different
reactions to and tolerances for drugs coupled with the fact that the
severity of a patient's condition may warrant a different level of risk
acceptance, which factors are best monitored and evaluated by doctors,
and the public policy of this state for reducing frivolous malpractice
actions against professionals.... ."
The court also noted the limited legislative entry into this field,'" and
indicated that a different rule may apply to cases arising after January
1, 1993, the effective date of the Georgia State Board of Pharmacy's
latest drug review and patient counseling rules.'
"Nor will we here
decide whether these rules ... are mandated by federal law or are in
conflict with [Code section] 26-3-8(b)," said the court.'
Also significantly, the court declined to address the applicability of this rule to
"over-the-counter" non-prescription drugs or other products.'
Legal Malpractice. One of the most salutary developments in
recent years for attorneys concerned with legal malpractice (or the
avoidance thereof) was the publication during the survey period of J.
Randolph Evans' Practical Guide to Legal Malpractice Prevention.47
A book of this nature is particularly welcome in light of some unsettling
developments during the survey period.
The fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship' 48 took center
stage in several cases. Notably, in Tante v. Herring,' the court

141.
402-03
142.
143.
144.

209 Ga. App. at 522,434 S.E.2d at 67-68 (quoting Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399,
(S.D. I1. 1985)).
Id. at 521-22, 434 S.E.2d at 67.
See O.C.G._A tit. 26, chs. 3, 4 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
209 Ga. App. at 523, 434 S.E.2d at 69 (citing Rules of Ga. State Bd. of Pharmacy

§ 480-31-.01).

145. Id. (citing O.C.GA § 26-3-8(b) (1982 & Supp. 1994).
146. Id. at 521, 434 S.E.2d at 67.
147. J. RANDOLPH EVANS, PRACTICAL GUmE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE PREVENTION
(1993). A second edition was issued in 1994. This publication is available from the
Georgia Institute of Continuing Legal Education.
148. See id. at 94-95.
149. 211 Ga. App. 322, 439 S.E.2d 5 (1993), reu'd in part on other grounds, No.
594G0476 (Ga. Oct. 31, 1994).
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allowed an action against an attorney by former clients to be based on
the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty even though the attorney had
been successful in the underlying representation. In this somewhat
sordid case, Tante, the attorney, represented Mr. and Mrs. Herring in
connection with her Social Security disability claim.'" "Tante was
given medical reports showing [Mrs. Herring] had a severe decrease in
her desire for sex .... [Sihortly after their first meeting, Tante advised
her that she would be less depressed and would feel better if she would
enter into a sexual relationship with him.""' Subsequently, "Tante
infected Mrs. Herring with two strains 15
of2 venereal disease with which
she unknowingly infected Mr. Herring.
Holding that "[a] successful monetary result on a claim does not mean
that a lawyer cannot, per se, otherwise breach his professional responsibilities to his clients," the court of appeals thus allowed the Herrings'
legal malpractice claim.'
"[Wihile Tante may have been successful
in securing an award from the Social Security Administration, the record
establishes that as a result of his actions both of his clients were
otherwise severely damaged because of his representation of them.""
As the supreme court subsequently pointed out,' however, the true
ground of liability was not malpractice, which, after all, is grounded in
negligence,'" but the intentional breach of Tante's fiduciary duties to
the Herrings. By his conduct, "Tante assumed an interest antagonistic
to his clients and their cause, and contrary to his role as their trusted
attorney. 1 57 Drawing extensively from agency cases,'" and invoking
O.C.G.A. section 51-1-6,"' Georgia's catchall "no wrong without a
remedy" statute for torts, both the court of appeals and the supreme
court in Tante not only clarified a new dimension to the liability of

150. The evidence showed an attorney.client relationship with both Mr. and Mrs.
Herring. Id. at 323-24, 439 S.E.2d at 8.
151. Id. at 326, 439 S.E.2d at 9.
152. Id. at 323, 439 S.E.2d at 7.
153. Id. at 324, 439 S.E.2d at S.
154. Id. at 327, 439 S.E.2d at 10.
155. See Tante v. Herring, No. 594G0476 (Ga. Oct. 31, 1994), slip op. at 3.
156. "Malpractice is a particular form of negligence that consists of not applying to the
exercise of the practice the degree of skill or care which is ordinarily employed by the
profession generally under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances."
GEORGIA TORTS, supra, note 19, § 5-1, at 93 (emphasis added).
157. 211 Ga. App. at 327, 439 S.E.2d at 10.
158. See, e.g., Dolvin Realty Co. v. Holley, 203 Ga. 618, 48 S.E.2d 109 (1948). See
generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 9-4.
159. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 (1982).
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lawyers to their clients,' but also gave increased definition to the
status of breach of fiduciary duty as an independent tort.1 '
Both Tante and Coleman v. Hicks,6 2 discussed above," made
clear once again that an attorney's violation of ethical duties imposed by
the Code of Professional Responsibility is not enough, standing alone, to
state a claim for legal malpractice.'" "The correct statement of the
law ... is that 'standing alone' a violation of a bar standard will not
support a legal malpractice claim."'
If, however, the unethical
conduct proximately results in damage to the client, as it did in Tante,
it is actionable on that independent basis.'"
If Tante stands for the rule that too much communication (at least of
the wrong kind) with a client is an actionble breach of fiduciary duty,
then Thomas v. White 7 establishes the proposition that not enough
communication can have the same result.' Plaintiff's underlying case
was dismissed after defendant attorneys failed to fie a timely demand
for a jury trial as required by local court rules.'6 9 Plaintiff testified
that, instead of telling her this, defendant White initially misrepresented
to her that a $30,000 settlement offer was pending, and "after [plaintiff]
did not hear from him for almost two months, she repeatedly attempted
to contact White over a period of weeks, but he would not speak with her
and would not return her calls."'7 Plaintiff further alleged that, when
she eventually did speak to White, he continued to represent to her that
the case was not lost and he was working on it.'
The court held this disputed testimony was sufficient to create a jury
issue on the question of punitive damages." 2 "[Elven without the

160. An attorney's breach of fiduciary duty liability for intentional misconduct towards
clients can perhaps be analogized to a physician's battery liability for intentional
mistreatment of patients. See Georgia Torts, supra note 9, § 2-2.
161. See Nilan's Alley, Inc. v. Ginsburg, 208 Ga. App. 145, 430 S.E.2d 368 (1993)

(although employee as agent owed "fiduciary obligations" to employer, employee's conduct
did not
162.
163.
164.
at 469,
165.

breach those obligations).
209 Ga. App. 467, 433 S.E.2d 621 (1993).
See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
See Tante, 211 Ga. App. at 327-28, 439 S.E.2d at 10-11; Coleman, 209 Ga. App.
433 S.E.2d at 623.
211 Ga. App. at 328, 439 S.E.2d at 11 (emphasis in original).

166. Id.
167. 211 Ga. App. 140, 438 S.E.2d 366 (1993).
168. Id. at 141, 438 S.E.2d at 367.
169. Id. at 140-41, 438 S.E.2d at 367. But see Lakes v. Marriott Corp., 264 Ga. 475,

448 S.E.2d 203 (1994).
170. 211 Ga. App. at 142, 438 S.E.2d at 368.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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evidence of the misstatements of fact because of the attorney-client
relationship between these parties, [defendants failure to communicate
with [plaintiff] about the status of her case, under the circumstances
here, could be sufficient to constitute fraud.""'
Although Thomas illustrates perhaps an extremeexample of failure
to communicate, this problem in its lesser forms is one of the besetting
sins of too many lawyers. As Evans points out, "[elven if the case is
competently and expeditiously handled, inadequate communication may
create the opposite impression." 174 Now that the deliberate failure to
communicate with clients is a ground for punitive damages, the attorney
readers of this survey would be well advised to whittle down their stacks
of telephone message slips!
17
In a final case of consequence, the court in Zepp v. Toporek 1
reinforced the admonitory nature of legal malpractice actions by holding
the injured client is not required to pursue other available remedies
before recovering from the negligent lawyer.176 Plaintiff in Zepp
alleged defendant, who had served as her attorney while she was a
minor in settling a personal injury case over twenty years earlier, had
knowingly encouraged her guardian to settle for an inadequate amount.
Defendant contended plaintiff's instant claim against him constituted an
unauthorized collateral attack on the original judgment, and plaintiff's
remedy was to have the original judgment set aside. 177 "[iMt is not the
law in this state that clients seeking to sue their attorneys for malpractice or misconduct which resulted in an adverse or unacceptable
judgment must first set aside that judgment before proceeding against
their attorneys," responded the court of appeals.1 7' Assuming the
client can prove the attorney acted negligently or otherwise improperly,
it certainly seems fair not to require the client to incur additional
expense to undo the damage the attorney caused.

173. Id. Accord, Holmes v. Drucker, 201 Ga. App. 687, 411 S.E.2d 728 (1991).
174. EvANs, supra note 157, at 24.
175. 211 Ga. App. 169, 438 S.E.2d 636 (1993).
176. Id. at 171, 438 S.E.2d at 639.
177. Id. at 170, 438 S.E.2d at 639.
178. Id. at 172, 438 S.E.2d at 640. Accord, Peters v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 211 Ga. App.
587, 440 S.E.2d 222 (1993) (physical precedent only).
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IMPUTED AND RELATIONAL LIABILITY

A

Liability of Alcohol Providers
Georgia's "dram shop" law, Code section 51-1-40,"9 received significant reinterpretation from the supreme court in Riley v. H&H Operations.'s That section provides a civil cause of action against any
person who provides alcohol to a person not of lawful drinking age
"knowing" the minor will "soon" be driving a motor vehicle."81 Defendants contended. the term "soon" was unconstitutionally vague, and the
18 2
term "knowing" referred only to actual, not constructive, knowledge.
The supreme court disagreed on both points.'
"Although 'soon' does
not have a fixed temporal meaning, in the context of the Act it is
sufficiently definite and certain in meaning to give proper guidance to
those bound by its terms."' Thus, the four and one-half hour interval
in this case was "soon" enough for the court.
Likewise, the court adopted a broad construction of the term "knowing," holding that "[ilf one in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known that the recipient of the alcohol was a minor and would be
driving soon, he or she will be deemed to have knowledge of that
fact."' The court overruled the contrary rule established by the court
87
of appeals,"s which was criticized in last year's torts survey."
Furthermore, in Steedley v. Huntley's Jiffy Stores, Inc.,x 8 the court of
appeals held that a "consumer of alcohol, even an underage consumer,
may not recover from the provider of that alcohol for injuries resulting
from the consumption of the alcohol.""8 9 The court explained that "[a]s
between provider and consumer, the consumer has the last opportunity

179. O.C.GA. § 51-1-40 (Supp. 1994).
180. 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659 (1993).
181. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b).
182. 263 Ga. at 653, 436 S.E.2d at 660.
183. Id.
184. 263 Ga. at 654, 436 S.E.2d at 660.
185. Id. at 655, 436 S.E.2d at 661.
186. See Perryman v. Lufran, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 654, 434 S.E.2d 112 (1993) and
Manuel v. Koonce, 206 Ga. App. 582,425 S.E.2d 921 (1992), overruled inpart by Riley, 263
Ga. at 655 n.3, 436 S.E.2d at 661 n.3. See also the federal companion case to Perryman,
Jaques v. Lever, 831 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
187. See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al. Torts, supra note 23, at 424-26.
188. 209 Ga. App. 23, 432 S.E.2d 625 (1993).
189. Id. at 23, 432 S.E.2d at 626.
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to avoid the effect of the alcohol, by not drinking or not driving, and thus
as between the two, the negligence of the consumer is greater."'°
B. Master and Servant
Scope of Employment. If a motor vehicle is involved in a collision,
and the operator of the vehicle is in the employment of the vehicle's
owner, a presumption arises that the employee is in the scope of his
" ' The employer must rebut
employment at the time of the collision.19
the presumption by "clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence,""
which it did not do in Bell v. Stroh Brewery Co.' 3 In that case,
evidence that the employee's job was such that she needed the company
car at all times, and that she had discretion about when and whether to
go to the office, created a jury question despite evidence that she was
merely on the way to the office from her home at the time of the
accident.'"
Once the employer has presented evidence that the
employee is not in the scope of employment, however, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to contradict it with evidence of his own. He cannot
simply rely on the presumption in the face of evidence to the contrary,
as plaintiff learned in Carrollv. Americal Corp.9 5
Negligent Hiring and Retention. In Diaconescu v. Hettler,"9 the
Diaconescus sued the Hettlers, their neighbors, after Murphy Munsey,
the man the Hettlers hired to watch their property while they were out
of the country, shot Mrs. Diaconescu with a high powered rifle as she sat
in a neighbor's garage. 97 The issue for negligent hiring and retention
purposes was whether defendants hired Murphy Munsey (the name
alone should have alerted them to something) as a security guard or
merely to "watch" their property, since "a security service offering the
use of its employees to patrol premises for the purpose of protecting
persons and property 'may have been duty bound to exercise a greater
amount of care to ascertain [whether] its employees were [fit to perform

190.
191.
(1979).
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 24, 432 S.E.2d at 626.
See Allen Kane's Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777, 257 S.E.2d 186, 188
Id.
209 Ga. App. 850, 434 S.E.2d 812 (1993), cert. granted.
Id. at 851, 434 S.E.2d at 812-13.
207 Ga. App. 651, 428 S.E.2d 811 (1993).
210 Ga. App. 191, 435 S.E.2d 489 (1993).
Id. at 192, 435 S.E.2d at 490.
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the security services offered].' 1
Leaving aside the fact that the
Hettlers were not a "security service," the evidence showed Murphy
Munsey had been hired only to "watch" the property (i.e. maintain a
presence on the premises), not to "protect" the Hettler home.1 Thus,
summary judgment for the Hettlers was proper.'
Application of the rule stated in Hettler to the facts of Kemp v. RouseAtlanta, Inc.,201 however, yields a somewhat inconsistent result,
because the claim against defendants in Kemp was for the negligent
hiring and retention of a security officer. Plaintiffs alleged defendant
employer was responsible for "inadequate and improper training" of the
security officer.'
Rejecting this claim, however, the supreme court
held that "the training [the officer] was required by statute and agency
regulations to receive was [not] designed to uncover the trainee's latent
character defects for purposes of placing the employer on notice that the
trainee possessed violent or criminal propensities. Thus [defendant's]
failure to provide that training does not avail [plaintiffs]."2' 3 It would
seem that the "greater amount of care" expected of a security service
should impose on it a common-law duty to attempt to identify such
character defects.
Workers' Compensation Immunity. The tort immunity conferred
on those who are liable for workers' compensation benefits' can be
both a sword and a shield. For purposes of tort law, of course, the
concern is with its applicability as a shield from tort liability. In Yoho
v. Ringier of America, Inc.,' the supreme court held the way to
determine whether the tort immunity applies to a given defendant is
first to ascertain whether there is any basis for the defendant to be
liable for compensation benefits.'
"Only an entity who is secondarily
liable for workers' compensation benefits under [O.C.G.A. §1 34-9-8(a) is
consequently entitled to tort immunity under [O.C.G.A. §1 34-9-11."2"
The court concluded that "[a] mere owner to whom the contractual

198. Id. at 193, 435 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting C.K. Security Sys. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 137 Ga. App. 159, 161, 223 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1976)).
199. Id. at 192, 435 S.E.2d at 490.
200. Id. at 194, 435 S.E.2d at 492.
201. 207 Ga. App. 876, 429 S.E.2d 264 (1993).
202. Id. at 878, 429 S.E.2d at 267.
203. Id., 429 S.E.2d at 267 (quoting Kelley v. Baker Protective Serve., 198 Ga. App.
378, 379-80, 401 S.E.2d 585, 586 (1991)).
204. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992).
205. 263 Ga. 338, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993).
206. Id. at 341, 434 S.E.2d at 59.
207. Id.
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obligation of performance is owed and from whom no contractual
obligation of performance is due is not a 'principal contractor' under
[O.C.G.A. §1 34-9-8,"' even if he undertakes a project under his own
general supervision. "[Tihis would not be the result of his status as an
'owner,' but of his lack of status as a 'contractor.'
,
There are a whole range of things the workers' compensation tort
immunity does not shield in any event. Intentional torts2 ' and
nonphysical injuries21 ' during the survey period were held not to be
covered by workers' compensation, and, accordingly, the defendants were
not immune from tort liability.
C. Negligent Entrustment
Just as the drunk driver in the section discussed above on alcohol
liability could not recover from the alcohol provider for his own
injuries,"' an injured drunk driver cannot recover from the automobile
owner under a negligent entrustment theory.2"' With this factual
214
senerio before it, the court of appeals in Ridgeway v. Whisman
stated that
[tihe liability of the owner in a negligent entrustment action does not
result from imputing the negligence of the incompetent driver to the
owner, rather "[niegligent entrustment of a motor vehicle to an
incompetent driver is an independent wrongful act of the vehicle's
owner which is a concurrent, proximate cause of injury when it
combines with the negligence of the operator." 15
Thus, the court concluded the drunk driver's parents could not recover
for her wrongful death because her own wrongful act of getting drunk
was the sole proximate cause of her injuries.2 16

208. Id. at 343, 434 S.E.2d at 60.
209. Id. at 341, 434 S.E.2d at 59; accord, Dye v. Trussway, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 139, 438
S.E.2d 194 (1993).
210. See Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 211 Ga. App. 375, 439 S.E.2d 106 (1993);
Griggs v. All-Steel Bldgs., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 253, 433 S.E.2d 89 (1993).
211. Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 703, 434 S.E.2d 500 (1993).
212. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
213. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 12-5, for a discussion of this
doctrine. See also Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 207 Ga. App. 853, 429 S.E.2d 530 (1993).
214. 210 Ga. App. 169, 435 S.E.2d 624 (1993).
215. Id. at 170, 435 S.E.2d at 626 (quoting GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, at 164).

216. 210 Ga. App. at 171, 435 S.E.2d at 627.
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In Gafford v. Duncan,"7 defendant's employee used a companyowned vehicle to commit an aggravated assualt against his wife. 218
Alleging that defendant had negligently entrusted the vehicle to her
husband, plaintiff brought suit for her personal injuries. The court held
that even though defendant had knowledge its employee had previously
abused his wife, it was not foreseeable that he would use the vehicle to
commit an assault against her. 19 Therefore, since the employee's
unforeseeable criminal acts were the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries, defendant
could not be held liable under any theory of negligent
220
entrustment.
D.

Family Purpose Doctrine
The court in Cox v. Rewis 2 applied the family purpose doctrine's
to hold a noncustodial parent liable for an accident caused by her son,
who did not have the general use of her car, but was allowed to use it for
specific purposes while visiting with her.'
As Cox illustrates, perhaps surprisingly for a doctrine grounded in fiction, the courts tolerate
little fiction in its application. The formal legal arrangements regarding
the car are typically accorded little weight; instead, the courts look to
the facts of each case to determine whether a family purpose is involved.
Thus, in Whitley v. Ditta,24 the fact that the father was the named
defendant, but the vehicle was titled in the mother, did not prevent
application of the doctrine when the evidence showed that "the vehicle
was purchased by the father and mother with joint funds, and that it
was insured by the father under a family insurance policy .... '
Plaintiffs in Jones v. Walker' sought to hold defendants liable
under the family purpose doctrine for injuries their daughter received

217.
218.

210 Ga. App. 350, 436 S.E.2d 78 (1993).
Id. at 350, 436 S.E.2d at 78. While in his employer's truck, plaintiff's husband

chased his wife's car, repeatedly rammed it with the truck, and forced it off the road into
a ditch where it fRipped. Id.
219. Id. at 351, 436 S.E.2d at 79.
220. Id.
221. 207 Ga. App. 832, 429 S.E.2d 314 (1993).
222. See generally GEORGIA TORTs, supra note 9, § 13-1. "When the conditions for
application of the family purpose doctrine are present, vicarious liability may be imposed
upon a family member (usually the head ofhousehold) for the negligence of another family
member under a fictitious agency theory." Murch v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 538, 538, 304
S.E.2d 750, 751 (1983).
223. 207 Ga. App. at 834-35, 429 S.E.2d at 317.
224. 209 Ga. App. 553, 434 S.E.2d 108 (1993).
225. Id. at 556, 434 S.E.2d at 111.
226. 209 Ga. App. 532, 433 S.E.2d 726 (1993).
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when the horse she was riding collided with defendants' horse.' All
animal lovers will be pleased to know that the court concluded there is
no such thing as a "family purpose animal," and plaintiffs' reliance on
this doctrine was misplaced.'
IV.

NEGLIGENCE DEFENSES

Proximate Cause Defenses
The foreseeability of independent criminal acts in relation to a
defendant's liability for a plaintiff's injuries" was the subject of
several survey period cases. Of particular interest is the supreme court's
holding in Southeastern Stages, Inc. v. Stringer,' reversing the court
of appeals decision, 1 which was discussed in last year's survey. 2
The supreme court specifically disapproved the court of appeals'
application of premises liability law to common carriers' to find a
jury question concerning the foreseeability of one passenger being shot
Concerning a carrier's duty of
to death by another passenger.'
passenger protection, the high court stated:
A.

knowledge of conditions which are likely to result in an assualt upon
a passenger, or which constitute a source of potential danger, imposes
the duty of active vigilance on the part of the carrier's agents and the
adoption of such steps as are warranted in the light of existing
hazards.'
Under this standard, the court found that two previous passenger
attacks on bus drivers were insufficient to raise a question of fact
concerning the foreseeability of the present attack since "there was no
evidence that conditions existing on the Augusta-Atlanta route travelled
by the decedent were likely to expose passengers to a reasonably

227. I4 at 535, 433 S.E.2d at 728.

228. I&
229. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 15-1.
230. 263 Ga. 641, 437 S.E.2d 315 (1993).
231. Stringer v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 223, 427 S.E.2d 494 (1992),
reu'd, 263 Ga. 641, 437 S.E.2d 315 (1993).

232. See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note 23, at 427.
233. 263 Ga. at 642, 437 S.E.2d at 318. O.C.G.JA f 46-9-132 (1992) states that "[al
carrier of passengers must exercise extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons
of his passengers .... " Id.
234. 263 Ga. at 642, 437 S.E.2d at 317.
235. 263 Ga. at 643,437 S.E.2d at 318 (quoting Gordon v. Chicago Transit Auth., 470
N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (111. App. Ct. 1984)).
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Jury questions were held to exist, however,
foreseeable danger."'
concerning the foreseeability of criminal activity in two survey period
cases. In Wilks v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc., 7 there was a jury
question concerning defendant's knowledge of loiterers' assaults upon
customers,"s and, likewise, in .Collins v. Shepherd,'9 there was a
jury question concerning defendant's knowledge of previous fights at its
nightclub.2"
In addition to criminal activity, other actions by third parties may
intervene in the causal chain of events to insulate a defendant from
negligence liability.2" Attorneys in Georgia may take some comfort in
In that legal malpractice
reading Meiners v. Fortson & Whiter.'
action, plaintiff's first lawyer was unable to perfect service of plaintiff's
original personal injury suit because of the lawyer's negligence in failing
to provide a proper service address for the personal injury defendant.
Six months before the statute of limitations ran on the personal injury
claim, plaintiff fired her first lawyer and hired a new one, who also
negligently failed to perfect service of the suit within the required six
Plaintiff then brought the instant malpractice action
months.'
against her first lawyer.2' The court of appeals, affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to defendant, specifically found:
[w]here, as here, the second attorney is specifically advised by the first
attorney that a party needs to be served and the second attorney has
more than six months to accomplish that service, it is not reasonably
foreseeable that the second attorney will fail to cure the first attorney's
error and perfect service as a matter of law.'

236. Id. at 644, 437 S.E.2d at 319. Other survey period cases in which no jury question
was created concerning the foreseeability of third party criminal activity included: Woods
v. Kim, 207 Ga. App. 910, 429 S.E.2d 262 (1993) (robbery and shooting outside defendant's
store); Gafford v. Duncan, 210 Ga. App. 350, 436 S.E.2d 78 (1993) (defendant's employee
committed an aggravated assualt upon plaintiff while driving defendant's vehicle); Hunter
v. Rouse-Atlanta, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 131, 438 S.E.2d 188 (1993) (shooting at Underground
Atlanta).
237. 207 Ga. App. 842, 429 S.E.2d 322 (1993).

238. Id. at 844, 429 S.E.2d at 324.
239. 212 Ga. App. 54, 441 S.E.2d 458 (1994).

240. Id. at 56, 441 S.E.2d at 459.
241. See Allen v. Crawford, 211 Ga. App. 99, 438 S.E.2d 178 (1993); Powell v. Harsco
Corp., 209 Ga. App. 348, 433 S.E.2d 608 (1993).
242. 210 Ga. App. 612, 436 S.E.2d 780 (1993).

243. Id. at 612-13, 436 S.E.2d at 780-81.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 613, 436 S.E.2d at 781. See also Mobley v. Flowers, 211 Ga. App. 761, 440
S.E.2d 473 (1994) (not foreseeable that plaintiffs truck would malfunction and come into
contact with a live electrical wire); Taylor v. Atlanta Ctr. Ltd., 208 Ga. App. 463, 430
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The supreme court in C. W. Matthews ContractingCo. v. Gover' was
faced with determing the constitutionality of the portion of O.C.G.A.
section 40-8-76.124 that prohibits the introduction of a plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat safety belt into evidence. Finding the statute did
not violate due process or equal protection standards, the court held it
passed constitutional muster.'
B. Limitation ofActions
The court of appeals has continued to explore the issue of the date a
cause of action for medical malpractice accrues pursuant to O.C.G.A.
After two recent attempts to reach an agreesection 9-3-71.' 4
ment,' ° the court in Bryant v. Crider251 seems, at last, to have made
the determination that the statute of limitations begins to run for such
an action at the time the injury occurs and manifests itself to the plaintiff.2 2 The court flatly rejected plaintiff's argument that the limita-

S.E.2d 841 (1993) (not foreseeable that a hotel patron would drop a broom onto plaintiffs
head from 17th floor at New Year's celebration).
246. 263 Ga. 108, 428 S.E.2d 796 (1993).
247. O.C.GA § 40-8-76.1 (1994).
248. 263 Ga. at 110, 428 S.E.2d at 799.
249. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a) (Supp. 1994). The four recognized points at which such a tort
action may accure are: "(1) When the defendant breaches his duty; (2) when the plaintiff
is first injured; (3) when the plaintiffbecomes aware of his injury; or (4) when the plaintiff
discovers the causal relationship between his injury and the defendant's breach of duty."
Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Pattillo Constr. Co., 254 Ga. 461, 462, 330 S.E.2d 344,
345 (1985), overruled in part by Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 258
Ga. 365, 368 S.E.2d 732 (1988). See also Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note
23, at 430.
250. Jones v. Lamon, 206 Ga. App. 842, 426 S.E.2d 657 (1992) (four-judge plurality
argued for point two; two-judge special concurrence argued for point three; and three-judge
dissent argued for point four); Vitner v. Miller, 208 Ga. App. 306, 430 S.E.2d 671 (1993)
(four-judge plurality argued for point three; one-judge special concurrence argued for point
three and advocated the acceptance of the "continuous treatment" doctrine; two-judge
dissent argued for point two; and one judge dissented without opinion).
251. 209 Ga. App. 623, 434 S.E.2d 161 (1993).
252. It is particularly interesting to note that Judge Blackburn, who wrote the opinion
in Bryant, also wrote the dissent in Vitner. In Vitner he advocated the beginning of the
limitations period as the date on which the injury had occurred, which he pinpointed as the
date on which plaintiffs abortion had taken place, even though plaintiff was not aware of
her injury until a few days later. 208 Ga. App. at 310, 430 S.E.2d at 674. In Bryant,
however, he seems to have accepted the arguments of his colleagues in the previous
opinions and reached the more equitable conclusion that the statute of limitations began
to run when plaintiff experienced the symptoms of her abortion-related injury, not at the
time of her actual injury, which, following his reasoning in the Vitner dissent, would have
occurred on the date of her abortion. 209 Ga. App. at 627, 434 S.E.2d at 165.
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tions period should not begin to run until she discovered the causal
relationship between her injury and defendants' negligence, stating: "A
subjective belief that symptoms were due to some other cause unrelated
to the alleged negligence does not change the point at which the injury
occurred."=m
In Craven v. Lowndes County Hospital Authority, 4 the general
medical malpractice statute of repose' withstood a claim of unconstutionality based on equal protection grounds.26 The supreme court
found the classification of plaintiffs pursuant to this statute bore a
rational relationship to the legislative goal of "providing for the abolition
of a cause of action after the passage of the time provided."2 7 The
court applied this statute in Bieing v. Battle2" to put an end to
plaintiff's lawsuit filed in 1990 concerning allegedly AIDS-tainted blood
she received during an operation in 1982.1 g Although the five-year
statute of repose did not become effective until 1985, and plaintiff did
not know she had contracted AIDS until 1989, the court of appeals had
no problem with applying the statute retroactively to the 1982 injury
since plaintiffs complaint was filed after the statute's effective date.'

253. 209 Ga. App. at 626, 434 S.E.2d at 164. For two other survey period medical
malpractice cases in which the complaints were deemed untimely filed see Crowe v.
Humana, 263 Ga. 833, 439 S.E.2d 654 (1994), and Knight v. Sturm, 212 Ga. App. 391, 442
S.E.2d 255 (1994).
254. 263 Ga. 657, 437 S.E.2d 308 (1993).
255. O.C.G.A § 9-3-71(b) (Supp. 1994). This Code section states: "[11n no event may
an action for medical malpractice be brought more than five years after the date on which
the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred." Id.
256. 263 Ga. at 659, 437 S.E.2d at 309. Plaintiff claimed the statute created an
arbitrary classification of plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. The first claimed
classification was victims of medical malpractice who discover their bodily harm within five
years of the date of the negligent act or omission and may bring a cause of action. The
second classification was for victims who do not discover their injuries until after five years
from the date of the negligent act or omission and are thereby forbidden from bringing
their causes of action. Id.
257. Id at 660, 437 S.E.2d at 310. In his dissent, Justice Benham argued for a
substantial relation intermediate standard of review. Under this standard, he concluded
that given the nature of the injuries at issue and their difficult detectability, the
legislature's five year cut-off date was arbitrary and did not bear "a fair and substantial
relation to the objective" of minimizing the "long tail" problem. Id. at 663, 437 S.E.2d at
312 (Benham J., dissenting).
258. 209 Ga. App. 874, 434 S.E.2d 719 (1993).
259. Id. at 875, 434 S.E.2d at 720.
260. Id. The court based its holding in part upon an earlier supreme court decision,
Hunter v. Johnson, 259 Ga. 21, 376 S.E.2d 371 (1989), which found that statutes of
limitation were procedural (rather than substantive) in nature thereby creating no
impediment for retroactive application. The Eleventh Circuit also reached this same result
in Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 992 F.2d 298 (11th Cir. 1993), in which plaintiff
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The reasoning in Bieling was also applied in Zechmann v. Thigpen '
to the minor's medical malpractice statute of repose.'
In finding
plaintiffs' complaint to be time barred under this statute, the court of
appeals recognized the "potential inequity of calculating the time of
ultimate repose from the alleged negligent act or omission [when] the
injury is subsequent ....

.'2

There being no present constitutional

2
question, however, the court passed this buck to the legislature.
In Henrickson v. Sammons,2' the supreme court reversed the court
of appeals decision in that case,' which held the 180-day statute of
limitations for O.C.G.A. section 34-6A-6(a) (Georgia Equal Employment
for the Handicapped Act)' 7 was applicable to plaintiff's claim brought
pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 19732 for-wrongful termination
of employment. 9 Finding "an overwhelming majority of federal courts
have characterized 29 U.S.C. § 794 as providing a cause of action for
injuries to the person,"2 70 the court determined that the most analogous state statute of limitations was the two-year period specified for
personal injuries.2
In Johnson v. Hardwick,272 the court of appeals
also noted that the limitations period for damaged bailed property is four
years, the same as for injury to personalty.' 73
Although there are a number of events under Georgia law that will
toll a statute of limitations, a motion to add additional parties is not one
of themY'4 Plaintiffs in Doyle Dickerson M1e Co. v. King'75 filed such

received a transfusion of AIDS-tainted blood in 1983, but did not file her lawsuit alleging
injury until 1989.
261. 210 Ga. App. 726, 437 S.E.2d 475 (1993).
262. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(cX2) (Supp. 1994).
263. 210 Ga. App. at 730, 437 S.E.2d at 478.
264. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 479.
265. 263 Ga. 331, 434 S.E.2d 51 (1993).
266. Henrickson v. Pain Control & Rehabilitation Inst., Inc., 205 Ga. App. 843, 424
S.E.2d 27 (1992), reu'd sub norn. Hendrickson v. Sammons, 263 Ga. 331, 434 S.E.2d 51
(1993).
267. O.C.G.A. § 34-6A-6(a) (1992).
268. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985).
269. 263 Ga. at 331, 434 S.E.2d at 51. Plaintiff claimed that he had been terminated
from his job after his employer learned that he was HIV positive. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 52.
270. Id. at 334, 434 S.E.2d at 53.
271. Id. at 332, 434 S.E.2d at 52 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1982)). In making this
ruling the supreme court recognized that it was creating a "disharmonious result with
regard to intrastate uniformity of statutes of limitation for claims of employment
discrimination." Id. at 335, 434 S.E.2d at 54.
272. 212 Ga. App. 44, 441 S.E.2d 450 (1994).
273. Id. at 45, 441 S.E.2d at 451 (citing O.C.GA. § 9-3-31 (1982)).
274. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 18-6.
275. 210 Ga. App. 326, 436 S.E.2d 63 (1993).
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a motion in the trial court to add two defendants nineteen days prior to
the expiration of the statute of limitations." 6 The trial court ruled on
the motion after the statute expired and allowed the addition of the
parties without any reference to the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 911-15(c). 2" In ruling that the two added defendants were entitled to
summary judgment, the court of appeals found the statute of limitations
was not tolled during the pendency of plaintiffs' motion and opined that
"[it was the duty of counsel to obtain a timely ruling ... " on the
motion.27 The law in Georgia provides a special limitations tolling
provision for unrepresented estates." 9 In Legum v. Crouch,'" the
court determined that this tolling provision is triggered automatically by
operation of law for claims belonging to the estate and may not be
invoked at the whim of the legal representative of the estate exclusively
for his own benefit."l

276. Id. at 326, 436 S.E.2d at 64.
277. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) (1993), states:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
to the date of the original pleadings if the foregoing provisions are satisfied, and
if within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him the
party 'to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense
on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought
against him.
See also Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129 (11th Cir. 1993).
278. 210 Ga. App. at 327, 436 S.E.2d at 65. See also McCabe v. Garrett, 211 Ga. App.
848, 440 S.E.2d 734 (1994) (unsuccessful appeal of motion to add a party defendant did not
toll statute of limitations).
279. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-92 (1982). "The time between the death of a person and the
commencement of representation upon his estate... shall not be counted against his
estate in calculating any limitation applicable to the bringing of an action, provided that
such time shall not exceed five years." Id. This Code section operates only for claims
belonging to a decedent's estate and would not toll the limitations period for any wrongful
death claims brought individually by a surviving spouse or child. See O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2
(Supp. 1994); Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983).
280. 208 Ga. App. 185, 430 S.E.2d 360 (1993). See also Dowlingv. Lopez, 211 Ga. App.
578, 298 S.E.2d 205 (1993) (O.C.GA. § 53-7-92 (1982) does not toll the limitations period
for survival actions that accrued at or before the date of death).
281. Id. at 188-89, 430 S.E.2d at 364. See additional discussion of this case supra at
notes 120-23, and accompanying text. Likewise, the court in Hobbs v. Arthur, 209 Ga. App.
855, 434 S.E.2d 748 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 264 Ga. 359, 444 S.E.2d 322 (1994)
found that plaintiff's alleged mental incapacity did not toll the statute of limitations for a
claim that had already been filed with the court, but which had been dilatorily served upon
defendant. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90, -91 (Supp. 1994).
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C. Assumption of the Risk
The defense of assumption of the risk is applicable in those situations
in which a plaintiff proceeds in a course of conduct with full knowledge
of the danger and risks associated with it. 2 One of the more unusual
risks of being involved in a lesbian relationship was brought to light
during this survey period in the case of Taylor v. Schander.2 The
facts of this case showed that one evening, while plaintiff Candace
Taylor and defendant Cynthia Schander were involved in a romantic
relationship with each other, they retired to defendant's home after
spending some time at a local bar. At defendant's house, both parties
sat on facing kitchen bar stools and began kissing each other. "Defendant got up and sat in plaintiff's lap and the couple resumed kissing.
Because of a certain movement defendant made with her arms, the stool
toppled and both women fell to the floor."284 Alleging various injuries,
plaintiff later filed her complaint against defendant. Plaintiff admitted
she consented to defendant's sitting in her lap, and the court of appeals
found as a matter of law that plaintiff had assumed the obvious risk of
danger in her activity.'
D.

Delay in Service
When a complaint is served after the applicable statute of limitations
has run, the question of the plaintiff's due diligence in perfecting service
comes into play.'
The court of appeals in Deloach v. Hewes"s7
determined that plaintiff could not be held responsible for the county
marshal's failure to serve defendant.'
Plaintiff filed his complaint,

282.

See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 19-1. See also Leonardson v. Georgia Power

Co., 210 Ga. App. 574, 436 S.E.2d 690 (1993).
283. 207 Ga. App. 627, 428 S.E.2d 806 (1993).
284. Id. at 627, 428 S.E.2d at 806.
285. Id., 428 S.E.2d at 807. Additional survey period cases in which the plaintiffs were
determined to have assumed the risk of their perilous undertakings included: Brown v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 Ga. App. 99, 432 S.E.2d 675 (1993) (attempt to free
overhead telephone wire from front-end loader near high-voltage electrical lines); Tennison
v. Lowndes-Echols Assoc. for Retarded Citizens, 209 Ga. App. 343, 433 S.E.2d 344 (1993)
(climbing atop a stack of lumber 14 feet high in an attempt to assist loading of lumber onto
forklift); Riley v. Brasuanas, 210 Ga. App. 865, 438 S.E.2d 113 (1993) (seven year old child
used mini trampoline to jump up to chin-up bar placed in doorway).
286. See generally Chance v. Planters Rural Tel. Coop., Inc., 219 Ga. 1, 131 S.E.2d 541
(1963); Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 348, 408 S.E.2d 111
(1991).
287. 211 Ga. App. 321, 439 S.E.2d 94 (1993).
288. Id at 321, 439 S.E.2d at 95.
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listing defendant's correct address, before the limitations period expired.
The marshal made no attempt :to serve the complaint for thirty-nine
days (thirty-five days after the statute had run), but was able to
accomplish service on the first attempt.2s The court found that, under
these circumstances, plaintiff had acted with due diligence since he had
"no authority to require the marshal's office to perform its duties
,290

E. Immunity
m ' discussed in
As a result of its decision in City of Rome v. Jordan,"
last year's survey article,' the Georgia Supreme Court in Cherokee
County v. Feise' remanded Cherokee County's appeal for reconsideration in light of the factors outlined in Jordanthat comprise the "special
relationship" requirement necessary to establish liability. 4 The court
of appeals made a very rigid application of the outlined factors and held
that since the "law enforcement officials ... did nothing" after learning
of the threats to plaintiff, 5 the assurance of action factor and the
justifiable or detrimental reliance factor were not met to create a special
relationship between plaintiff and the law enforcement officers." Nor

289. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 94-95.
290. Id. at 322, 439 S.E.2d at 95. Survey period decisions in which the court found a
lack of due diligence in perfecting service include: Walker v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 207 Ga. App. 874, 429 S.E.2d 289 (1993) (plaintiff waited 40 days after statute
had run to file motion for service by publication); Gordon v. Coles, 207 Ga. App. 889, 429
S.E.2d 297 (1993) (abuse of discretion to allow service to relate back to filing date when
plaintiff attempted improper service by publication and when personal service could have
been affected); Traver v. McKnight, 208 Ga. App. 278, 430 S.E.2d 164 (1993) (after initial
attempt to locate defendant no further attempts made for almost two years); Buzhardt v.
Payton, 210 Ga. App. 67, 435 S.E.2d 280 (1993) (no service upon defendant for over seven
months after plaintiff had correct address).
291. 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
292. Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note 23, at 435-36.
293. 263 Ga. 124, 428 S.E.2d 785 (1993).
294. 263 Ga. at 30, 426 S.E.2d at 864. For a "special relationship" to exist, the
following requirements must be met: (1) an explicit assurance, through promises or
actions, that action would be taken on behalf of the injured party (2) knowledge that
inaction could lead to harm; and (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured
party that there would be an affirmative undertaking. Id. at 29, 426 S.E.2d at 863.
295. Feise v. Cherokee County, 209 Ga. App. 733, 734, 434 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1993).
296. 263 Ga. at 30, 426 S.E.2d at 864. In a much more tempered special concurrence,
Judge Andrews, although reaching the same result, stated he could not "agree with the
majority's rigid application of [the] requirements to the facts at hand." Id. at 735, 434
S.E.2d at 552, (Andrews, J., concurring specially). He then went on to point out while the
police did take steps to investigate the threatening telephone calls made to plaintiff, there
was no assurance given for her protection since there was no evidence concerning who had
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was there a "special relationship" created in Smail v. Douglas County" that would cause the county to be liable for the inaction of its law
enforcement officers. In that case plaintiff's decedent was killed when
a rock was thrown by third parties from a bridge overpass onto a vehicle
in which she was a passenger.29 Although the sheriffs department
had received some reports of objects being thrown from the bridge and
had increased patrols in that area, the court determined that no special
relationship had been established between the county and plaintiff's
decedent.'
For all tort claims arising on or after January 1, 1991, the 1991
constitutional amendments language extending almost complete
sovereign immunity to the state and its departments and agenciesw°
was held to be applicable to counties in Gilbert v. Richardson.'
Interestingly, this case also pointed out that "nothing in the 1991
amendment ... invalidates by implication any pre-existing Act that
waived to some extent the immunity for the State and its departments
and agencies, including counties."'
Therefore, the unchanged
provision of O.C.G.A. section 33-24-51"° that allows a waiver of
sovereign immunity when a county purchases liability insurance for the
negligence of any agent or employee in the use of a motor vehicle is still
viable.'
The court of appeals in Gilbert went on to find, however,
that a county's participation in the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management
Agency ("GIRMA") authorized pursuant to Chapter 85 of Title 36 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated'
did not constitute liability
insurance for sovereign immunity waiver purposes (for post-1991 causes
of action) under the terms of O.C.G.A. section 36-85-20.''

actually made the calls. Therefore, since the caller's identify was unknown, there was no
specific action the police reasonably failed to take and plaintiff could not have reasonably
relied on any such action. Id.
297. 210 Ga. App. 830, 437 S.E.2d 824 (1993).
298. Id. at 830, 437 S.E.2d at 824.
299. Id. at 831, 437 S.E.2d at 825. See also City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga.
App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993) (no assurances made to homeowner before the inspection
and approval of the building of his home, which later had flooding in a basement area).
300. GA. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
301. 211 Ga. App. 795,440 S.E.2d 684 (1994), affd inpart & reu'd in part, 94 F.C.D.R.
3818 (Ga. Nov. 21, 1994).
302. 211 Ga. App. at 796, 440 S.E.2d at 685.
303. O.C.GA § 33-24-51 (1990).
304. See also Daniels v. Decatur County, 212 Ga. App. 378, 441 S.E.2d 790 (1994).
305. O.C.G.A §§ 36-85-1 et seq. (1993)
306. 211 Ga. App. at 796-97, 440 S.E.2d at 686 (citing O.C.G-.A § 36-85-20 (1993)).
This Code section specifically states that "participation by a municipality or county as a
member of an agency authorized by this chapter shall not constitute the obtaining of
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After a somewhat tempestuous litigational history,' 7 the issue
concerning the application of sovereign immunity to hospital authorities
was finally laid to rest by the supreme court's decision in Thomas v.
HospitalAuthority. In that case, the court found a hospital authority does not come within the ambit of the constitutional provision
extending sovereign immunity "to the state and all of its departments
and agencies,"
thereby holding this doctrine' does not apply to
hospital authorities."1 0 The court of appeals in Dyches v. McCorkle3 u
dealt with the application of local government board member immunity 3 to members of the Chatham County Metropolitan Planning
Commission. Determining that liability would attach only for actions
carried out in bad faith or for willful or wanton misconduct, the court
found that the commission members had immunity for the mere
negligent performance of their duties."
The sovereign immunity defense is also not available to counties in
actions based upon written contracts.3 1 Claiming to be the third party
beneficiary of a lease and maintenance agreement between DeKalb

liability insurance and no sovereign immunity shall be waived on account of such
participation." O.C.GA. § 36-85-20. In a decision rendered after the close of the survey
period, the supreme court on certiorari reversed this portion of the court of appeals opinion
and reiterated the ruling in Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129,414 S.E.2d 647 (1992),
that a county's participation in GIRMA waives sovereign immunity to the extent of its
liability coverage. Gilbert v. Richardson, 94 F.C.D.R. 3818 (Ga. Nov. 21, 1994).
307. See, e.g., Hospital Auth. v. Litterilla, 199 Ga. App. 345, 404 S.E.2d 796 (1991),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 262 Ga. 34, 413 S.E.2d 718 (1992).
308. 264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195 (1994).
309. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
310. 264 Ga. at 41, 440 S.E.2d at 196. The court also reasoned that public policy
considerations support the abolition ofsovereign immunity for hospital authorities, because
individuals who do business with them should not be accorded less protection than those
who do business with privately operated hospitals. Id. at 43, 440 S.E.2d at 197. See also
Lemonds v. Walton County Hosp. Auth., 212 Ga. App. 369, 441 S.E.2d 821 (1994).
311. 212 Ga. App. 209, 441 S.E.2d 518 (1994).
312. See O.C.GA. § 51-2-20 (Supp. 1994). This statute provides that
[a] person serving [on] any local governmental agency, beard, authority, or entity
shall be immune from civil liability for any act or any omission to act arising out
of such service if such person was acting in good faith within the scope of his or
her official actions and duties and unless the damage or injury was caused by the
willful or wanton misconduct of such person.
Id.
313. 212 Ga. App. at 216, 441 S.E.2d at 524.
314. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(c). Nor, said the court of appeals in Tyson v. Board
of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 212 Ga. App. 550, 442 S.E.2d 9 (1994), is the establishment
of sovereign immunity under the Constitution a taking of property rights requiring
compensation. Id.
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County and her employer, plaintiff in Burton v. DeKalb County315
sought damages for a slip and fall injury she received at her workplace.
Plaintiff brought her cause of action against the county as a negligent
failure to maintain the building as required under the lease agreement."'8 Finding the complaint sounded in tort rather than in contract, the court of appeals applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
bar the action and stated "the fact that plaintiff is an employee of one
of the parties to the [lease], without more, does not evince the requisite
intent to make plaintiff a beneficiary to the contract." 17
For claims against municipalities that arose on, or 'after January 1,
1991, the supreme court in City of Thomaston v. Bridges"l ' determined
the constitutional amendments language""9 has no effect, thereby
establishing the continued viability of O.C.G.A. section 36-33-1(a), which
outlines the situations for which insurance coverage may waive a
municipality's sovereign immunity.320 In reaching this conclusion, the
court declined to follow the holding of Hiers v. City of Barwick,32 1
which applied the previous constitutional language to municipalities.' 2
The court in Bridges instead reasoned that the intent behind the
enactment of the 1991 amendment was not complete and blanket
reinstatement of sovereign immunity which would entirely prevent the
public from bringing causes of action against governmental entities.323
Therefore, opined the court,
although in Hiers we construed the language in former Art. 1, § 2, 1 9
to include municipalities, we cannot allow that construction, which
effectuated the intent behind the 1983 provision, to bind this Court to
a construction which directly conflicts with the obvious intent of the
drafters of the 1991 amendment. ...

315. 209 Ga. App. 638, 434 S.E.2d 82 (1993).
316. Id. at 638, 434 S.E.2d at 83.
317. Id. at 639, 434 S.E.2d at 83-84.
318, 264 Ga. 4, 439 S.E.2d 906 (1994).
319. GA. CONsT. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
320. 264 Ga. at 7, 439 S.E.2d at 909. O.C.G.A. § 3633-1 (1993) provides that "[a]
municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance,
except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51, or unless the policy of insurance issued covers
an occurrence for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available." O.C.GA. § 33-2451 (1990), provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of liability insurance
coverage for causes of action "arising by reason of ownership, maintenance, operation, or
use of any motor vehicle by the municipal corporation..,." Id.
321. 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).
322. 264 Ga. at 6-7, 439 S.E.2d at 909.
323. Id at 7, 439 S.E.2d at 909.
324. Id. at 6, 439 S.E.2d at 909. Rather than distinguishing the Hiers opinion, as did
the majority, Justice Carley, concurring specially, would have overruled it to reach the
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The tragic facts of Queen v. Carey" necessitated a comprehensive
survey by the court of appeals of the purposes of intrafamily tort
immunity in Georgia. Plaintiffs brought suit for the wrongful death of
their nineteen-year-old son, who was accidentally run over and killed by
his step-grandfather (married to decedents maternal grandmother). The
evidence showed the decedent and his brother had from the time of their
birth been supported almost exclusively by defendant (whom they both
called "Papa") and his wife. When the complaint was filed in this action,
plaintiff mother and her surviving son were living in governmentsubsidized housing, but by the time of trial they were again living with
and being supported by defendant! 6 The trial resulted in a defendant's verdict. 7 On appeal, plaintiffs argued the relationship should
be evaluated only as of the time the action is filed. 28 The court disagreed, reiterating that
[tihe policy reasons behind the rule (of interfamily immunity] are to
prevent "(1) disturbance of domestic tranquility, (2) danger of fraud and
collusion, (3) depletion of the family exchequer, (4) the possibility of
inheritance, by the parent, of the amount recovered in damages by the
child,
and (5) interference with parental care, discipline, and con"2
trol.
In order to evaluate the abovegoing factors, the court ruled that the jury
was properly allowed to "view a broad span of evidence, stretching from
the time of injury to the claim and thereafter."3 °
F

Release
In Darby v. Mathis, 1 a case of first impression decided during this
survey period, plaintiff and his wife brought an action against defendant
for injuries plaintiff received in an automobile accident."
Plaintiff
settled the case with defendant and defendant's liability carrier and
sought to proceed against his own uninsured carrier.'
The court of

same result. Id. at 8, 439 S.E.2d at 910-11. (Carley, J., concurring specially).
325. 210 Ga. App. 41, 435 S.E.2d 264 (1993).
326. Id. at 42, 435 S.E.2d at 265.
327. Id. at 41-42, 435 S.E.2d at 264-65.
328. Id. at 42, 435 S.E.2d at 265.
329. Id. at 43, 435 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Clabough v. Rachwal, 176 Ga. App. 212, 213,

335 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985)).
330. Id. at 44, 435 S.E.2d at 266.
331. 212 Ga. App. 444, 441 S.E.2d 905 (1994).
332. Id. at 444, 441 S.E.2d at 906. Plaintiff also served his uninsured motorist
insurance carrier with a copy of the lawsuit. Id.
333. 1d
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appeals held that since the release signed by plaintiff in favor of
defendant impaired the uninsured carrier's subrogation claim, any
further recovery from the uninsured carrier was prohibited.'
Before she filed her personal injury complaint against defendant,
plaintiff in Heffley v. Adkins' executed a release with defendant's
employer which included the stipulation that plaintiff was not entitled
to receive workers' compensation benefits from the employer.'
Defendant argued plaintiff's release in favor of his employer prevented
her from suing him.337 The court held, however, that the terms of the
release contained only a promise not to sue the employer and did not
prohibit suits against its agents or employees.3 8 Concerning defendant's proffered defense of vicarious liability,'9 the court found that
while a release of an agent does act as a release of the principal,"' the
converse is not true unless specifically agreed upon in the covenant not
to sue.341
V.

OTHER TORT CAUSES OF ACTION

A.

Products Liability
The open and obvious rule and its corollary, the duty to warn,
dominated Georgia products liability law during the survey period to the
virtual exclusion of all other legal issues.
Under the Georgia "open and obvious rule" or "patent danger rule" it
is provided that "a product is not defective [either in its design or
manufacture] if the absence of a safety device is open and obvious, and
there is no
duty to warn of an obvious danger" or one that is "generally
42
known."3

334. Id. at 445, 441 S.E.2d at 907.
335. 209 Ga. App. 736, 434 S.E.2d 537 (1993).
336. Id. at 736, 434 S.E.2d at 538.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 737, 434 S.E.2d at 538. See Lackey v. McDowell, 262 Ga. 185, 415 S.E.2d
902 (1992); Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., 257 Ga. 55, 354 S.E.2d 417 (1987).
339. 209 Ga. App. at 737, 434 S.E.2d at 538-39. Defendant argued the release rule
concerning unnamed joint tortfeasors should not apply in this case since the employer's
liability, if any, was predicated upon its vicarious liability for the acts of its employee and
not upon a joint tortfeasor relationship. Id. at 737, 434 S.E.2d at 538.
340. See Harris v. Hanna Creative Enters., 208 Ga. App. 549, 430 S.E.2d 846 (1993).
341. 209 Ga. App. at 737, 434 S.E.2d at 538-39.
342. Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 228-29, 433 S.E.2d 67, 71 (1993)
(quoting Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., 195 Ga. App. 169, 170, 173, 393 S.E.2d 64, 65
(1990)).
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Thus, courts during the survey period denied recovery based on the open
and obvious rule in cases alleging failure to warn of the necessity for a
fence around a swimming pool to keep children out,m failure to install
a "deadman control" on both a lawnmower" and a rototiller (plaintiff's
decedent plowed himself under),' failure to warn that an exposed
cutting blade on a wood shaping machine might cut the operator's
hand, 34' that leaking gas might explode, 7 that eating rat poison is
harmful,' and failure to warn the wearer that a black bicycle helmet
lacked "conspicuity."349 In Powell v. Harsco Corp.,30 the court of
appeals held as a matter of proxhinate cause law the manufacturer could
not be liable for failure to warn when it was undisputed the installer of
the defective
product failed even to read the installation instruc3 51
tions
Only two open and obvious cases presented a jury question during the
survey period. 2 One was the federal diversity litigation in Neal v.
Toyota Motor Corp.'
In that case, plaintiffs were severely injured
when a floor mat shifted on the floor of plaintiffs Toyota automobile and
"overlapped the gas pedal and brake to such an extent that [plaintiff
driver] could not stop the car before it crashed into the side of, and
partially slid underneath, a semi-tractor trailer."'
Following jury
verdicts of $1,000,000 to each plaintiff, the district court denied
defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, holding that upon
application of the legally required "objective view" of the product, "the
Court cannot say that the particular danger involved in this case, a floor
mat shifting its position so as to encumber the brakes thereby preventing [them] from being depressed and stopping the car, was open and

343. Lamb v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 1993).
344. Vax v. Albany Lawn & Garden Ctr., 209 Ga. App. 371, 433 S.E.2d 364 (1993).
345. Smith v. Garden Way, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
346. Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 433 S.E.2d 67 (1993).
347. Exxon Corp. v. Jones, 209 Ga. App. 373,433 S.E.2d 350 (1993). The responsibility,
if any, was on the middleman/distributor. Id. at 375, 433 S.E.2d at 353.
348. ICI Americas, Inc. v. Banks, 211 Ga. App. 523,440 S.E.2d 38 (1993), cert.granted.
The court of appeals found the adequacy of warning issue was preempted by federal law.
Id. at 527, 440 S.E.2d at 42-43.
349. Berkner v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 721, 722 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
350. 209 Ga. App. 348, 433 S.E.2d 608 (1993).
351. Id. at 350, 433 S.E.2d at 610.
352. Neal v. Toyota Motor Corp., 823 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Batten v. Chrysler
Corp., 211 Ga. App. 173, 438 S.E.2d 647 (1993).
353. 823 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

354. Id. at 941.
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obvious to a reasonable person... ."35

As the court noted, "[to carry

1994]

Defendant's theory to its end, the open and obvious doctrine would
prevent recovery for any car accident because it is open and obvious that
The court,
a moving automobile is a dangerous instrument."m
however, remitted plaintiffs' judgments to $250,000 and $750,000,
the improper
respectively, because it felt the verdict was prejudiced35by
7
and unprofessional trial conduct of plaintiffs' counsel.
In Batten v. Chrysler Corp.,'

the court held there was a jury

question on the failure of defendant to warn of the dangers connected
with its inertia reel seat belts. 9 Indeed, the evidence that defendant
concealed the inadequacies of such seat belts and failed to use another
available passenger restraint system was "sufficient to authorize a
finding that [defendant] acted with willful, reckless, or wanton disregard
for life or property .... "360
B. Strict Liability
For animal owners in Georgia to be liable for their pets' injuries to
others there must be a showing, in the absence of a "leash law," that
the owner has reason to know of the animal's propensity to do the type
of harm which it inflicts.3 62 In Torrance v. Brennan,36 such knowledge was shown through evidence that on three prior occasions
defendants' dog had jumped up on people and attacked them with its
mouth, although no serious injury resulted on those occasions. Plaintiff
Defendants' claims they did
was severely bitten by the same dog.s
to
be
so vicious came to naught
propensity
pet
had
the
know
their
not
as the court of appeals specifically found that
[although the attack in question was the first time the dog's behavior
resulted in serious injury, [plaintiff's] evidence was more than
sufficient to allow a jury to find that the dog's established pattern of
behavior should have put (defendants] on notice that their animal

355. Id. at 942.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 945.
358. 211 Ga. App. 173, 438 S.E.2d 647 (1993), cert. granted.
359. Id. at 175, 438 S.E.2d at 649.
360. Id. at 174, 438 S.E.2d at 649.
361. See O.C.GA. § 51-2-7 (Supp. 1994); Tutak v. Fairley, 198 Ga. App. 307, 401 S.E.2d
73 (1991).
362. See Pearce v. Shanks, 153 Ga. App. 693, 266 S.E.2d 353 (1980); Chandler v.
Gately, 119 Ga. App, 513, 167 S.E.2d 697 (1969).
363. 209 Ga. App. 65, 432 S.E.2d 658 (1993).
364. Id. at 65, 432 S.E.2d at 659.
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might cause injury by displaying such behavior towards another at a
later date.
C.

Defamation

Victims of media defamation did not fare too well during the survey
period. In both Brewer v. Rogers' and Stange v. Cox Enterprises,
Inc.,
the subjects of false' media reports were unable to recover
because, as "public figures,"' 9 they could not meet the demanding
standard of proving defendants' statements were made with "'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that they were false or with reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity." 70' The court of appeals in both
cases advanced the standard rationale that "the stake of the people in
public business and the conduct of public officials is so great that neither
the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would protect
against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment policies." 1
Accordingly, "to insure the ascertainment and
publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First
Amendment
protect some erroneous publications as well as true
2
ones."

37

Questions concerning the element of publication were also prominent

in defamation cases during the survey period. Although a couple of
decisions applied the legal fiction that defamatory statements by one
member of an organization to another member having a duty to receive
such information are not "published,3 73 the court of appeals declined

365. Id. at 68, 432 S.E.2d at 661.
366. 211 Ga. App. 343, 439 S.E.2d 77 (1993).
367. 211 Ga. App. 731, 440 S.E.2d 503 (1994).
368. In Brewer, the court of appeals conceded the falsity of defendant's reports that
plaintiff, a high-school football coach, was involved in a widespread gambling operation
would be a jury question. Id. at 345, 440 S.E.2d at 80-81. In Stange, although the falsity
of the reports was somewhat less clear, they were admittedly in error in charging that
plaintiff, the acting Housing Commissioner of the City of Atlanta, was party to a suit by
a former homeowner. Id. at 731-35, 440 S.E.2d at 503-07.
369. Plaintiff in Brewer was a "public figure," and plaintiff in Stange was a "public
official.- 211 Ga. App. at 347, 439 S.E.2d at 81. 211 Ga. App. at 732, 440 S.E.2d at 505.
For purposes of the actual malice standard, however, the two are the same. See generally
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
370. Stange, 211 Ga. App. at 732, 440 S.E.2d at 506 (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
371. Id. at 733,440 S.E.2d at 506 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-

32 (1968)).
372. Brewer, 211 Ga. App. at 348, 439 S.E.2d at 82 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at
732)).
373. See Freeman v. Piedmont Hosp., 209 Ga. App. 845, 847-48, 434 S.E.2d 764, 767
(1993), rev'd on other grounds, 264 Ga. 343, 444 S.E.2d 796 (1994); Fly v. Kroger Co., 209
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to extend the fiction to include statements by the defendant to the
plaintiff's agent. 7 In Roberts v. Lane, 75 defendant sent three defamatory mailgrams to plaintiff's attorney. 6 The court of appeals
held this to be a publication to a third party 7 The facts of Roberts
are not clear on this point, but if the attorney was representing plaintiff
in the underlying matter in contention between the parties, this holding
probably does not represent the majority rule.37
D.

Invasion of Privacy
In Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 79 the supreme court
held that when plaintiff shot and killed an intruder in her home who
was sexually assaulting her, she also put to death her right of privacy
concerning the matter.'
Although Georgia has a "rape victim confidentiality" statute,881 the court did not analyze Tatum's claim pursuant to that statute,ss 2 but, rather, viewed her claim as one for "common

Ga. App. 75, 77, 432 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1993).
374. 210 Ga. App. 10, 12, 435 S.E.2d 227, 229 (1993).
375. 210 Ga. App. 10, 435 S.E.2d 227 (1993).
376. Id. at 12, 434 S.E.2d at 229.
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1952)
(applying Alabama law). "[I1f the language complained of was uttered only to the
complaining party or to his agent representing him in the matter discussed in the
communication, it is not such a publication as will support an action for slander." Id.
379. 263 Ga. 678, 436 S.E.2d 655 (1993).
380. Id. at 680, 436 S.E.2d at 658.
381. See O.C.GA. § 16-6-23 (1992).
382. 263 Ga. App. at 678, 436 S.E.2d at 656-57. It would have been interesting if the
court had done so. Unlike many jurisdictions, see LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP,
DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE (1989 & Supp. 1994),

Appendix H, Georgia does not appear to recognize an implied civil cause of action arising
from the breach of a criminal statute. See Cechman v. Travis, 202 Ga. App. 255, 256, 414
S.E.2d 282, 284 (1991); Oswald v. American Natl Can Co., 194 Ga. App. 882, 883, 392
S.E.2d 26,27 (1990); Sparks v. Thurmond, 171 Ga. App. 138,142,319 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1984).
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 61-62, 200 S.B.2d 127, 129 (1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Georgia Supreme Court held that even if a penal
statute established the public policy of the state on the subject to which it was addressed,
it must expressly create a civil cause of action for one to be available. This rule has never
received very thoughtful treatment by the Georgia courts, however, and it should be
reexamined. Certainly, in most instances, if a statute creates.a standard of care, conduct
which falls below that legislatively-created standard may be negligent per se and therefore
actionable. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 9, § 3-6. Thus, if merely negligent conduct that
violates a criminal statute is actionable, intentional violations of such statutes should a
fortiori be a basis for recovery. Victims, however, may take solace from the fact that in
most instances a criminal offense is overlapped by a tort action circumscribing the same
conduct: criminal rape equals civil battery;, criminal theft equals civil trespass, and so on.
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law invasion of privacy.' s The court adopted a two-part test to
evaluate this claim.3 4 First, it determined defendant had "legally
obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public significance,"' because Tatum, the killer of an intruder, was more than just
the victim of a sexual assault.'
Second, balancing Tatum's privacy
interests against freedom of the press, the court held the privacy right
38 7
from its inception has been "limited by the right to speak and print."
Because "[a] free press is necessary to permit public scrutiny on the
conduct of government and to ensure that government operates openly,
fairly, and honestly,' the court held the legitimate public interest in
this case overrode the victim's right to her privacy. 9
E. Wrongful Death
Much of the litigation in the area of wrongful death surrounds
Georgia's confusing scheme of multiple actions and statutory parties. In
Smith v. Memorial Medical Center,Inc.,' the court of appeals "recognize[d] that an individual's claim for wrongful death and an estate's
claim for the decedents pain and suffering are distinct causes of action.
The plaintiff in his individual capacity and in his capacity as administrator are legally different persons." 1 Thus, there was nothing wrong
with plaintiff's dismissing his wrongful death claim while leaving his
decedent's estate's claim for pain and suffering pending.'
Two cases with similar names illustrate the confusion that can arise
in a wrongful death case when the parents of a deceased minor child do
not comprise a family unit. In Hulsey v. Hulsey,' 3 the court of appeals
allowed the divorced, noncustodial father of the deceased minor child to
intervene in the action being prosecuted by the mother, "[blecause [the
mother] did not bring the action on behalf of both parents.' 4 Likewise, in Holsey v. Davidson,3 the court of appeals identified the

383. 263 Ga. at 679, 436 S.E.2d at 658.
384. Id. at 678, 436 S.E.2d at 657.

385. Id,
386. Id.
387. Id. at 679, 436 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122
Ga. 190, 204, 50 S.E. 68, 73 (1905)).
388. Id. at 679-80, 436 S.E.2d at 658.
389. Id. at 679, 436 S.E.2d at 658.
390. 208 Ga. App. 26, 430 S.E.2d 57 (1993).
391. Id. at 27, 430 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted).
392. Id.
393. 212 Ga. App. 269, 441 S.E.2d 477 (1994).
394. Id. at 269, 441 S.E.2d at 478.
395. 211 Ga. App. 529, 439 S.E.2d 742 (1993).

1994]

TORTS

509

biological father as the proper party to maintain an action for the
wrongful death of his illegitimate child, the mother being dead. M
"[Wihere one of the parents of a minor child dies before instituting an
action for the child's wrongful death, the representative of the parent's
estate is not authorized to bring such an action if there is a surviving
parent or other [statutory plaintiffi entitled to bring it. 97
Emory University v. Dorsey" s presented an even more recondite
problem. Decedent left behind a husband, who promptly dropped out of
the picture, and a minor child (not by the husband), who was subsequently adopted by decedent's parents, the plaintiffs in the instant case.
Defendant moved to dismiss this wrongful death action on the grounds
that (1) the child's adoption terminated his right to the claim and (2) in
any event, the surviving spouse was the proper statutory party.399
Ruling against defendants on both issues, the court of appeals held the
child's rights vested at the time of his mother's death, and were not
"To
terminated by his subsequent adoption by his grandparents.'
hold otherwise would not foster the public policy of encouraging
adoptions, particularly in cases such as this one where the child is
Furthermore, held the court, recent decisions
rendered an orphan."
of the Georgia Supreme Court' have established that the statutory
order of claimants "do[es] not operate to interfere with a superior court's
exercise of its 'general equitable powers to supervise litigation pending
before it in such a manner as fairly shall protect the substantive and
procedural rights of any party at interest."' 4° Because "[tihere was no
blood or legal relationship connecting [the husband] and [the child], and
[the husband] left the child with [plaintiffs] without an adequate remedy
at'law," ° this was a proper case to disregard the statutory scheme
and allow the action to the child. 405

396. Id. at 532, 439 S.E.2d at 745.
397. Id. (overruling Caylor v. Potts, 183 Ga. App. 133, 358 S.E.2d 291 (1987)).
398. 207 Ga. App. 808, 429 S.E.2d 307 (1993).
399. Id. at 808-09, 429 S.E.2d at 308.
400. Id. at 809, 429 S.E.2d at 308.
401. Id.
402. See, e.g., Brown v. Liberty Oil & Refining Corp., 261 Ga. 214, 403 S.E.2d 806
(1991).
403. 207 Ga. App. at 809, 429 S.E.2d at 309 (quoting OKelley v. Hosp. Auth., 256 Ga.
373, 374, 349 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1986) (Weltner, J., concurring)).
404. Id. at 810, 429 S.E.2d at 309.
405. Id.
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F

Fraud
In First Union National Bank v. Davies-Elliott, Inc.,4os defendant
bank sought to raise the defense of constructive fraud4° in response
to plaintiff customer's claim the bank had negligently cashed a check on
his account after a signatory deletion card had been signed. The bank
alleged plaintiff failed to inform it that the person whose signature was
to be deleted was no longer the secretary of the corporation, failed to
inform it that a signature had been obtained through a power of
attorney, and failed to inform it of the urgency of the situation.'
Citing the proposition that an obligation to communicate may arise from
the particular circumstances of a given situation,"' the court of
appeals found a jury question existed over the issue of plaintiff's
constructive fraud.4 0" The court of appeals also ruled in LeBrook v.
Jefferson'1 there was a proper jury question concerning defendant's
fraudulent representations about its ability to obtain builders and
commercial warranties, which induced plaintiffs to purchase their home
from defendant's company.41
Traditionally the doctrine of passive concealment4 has been limited
to situations involving residential homeowners and residential builder/sellers.4 4 The court of appeals in Condon v. Kunse4 5 succinctly

406.
407.
408.
409.

207 Ga. App. 791, 429 S.E.2d 161 (1993).
See O.C.G-.A § 23-2-51(b) (1982).
207 Ga. App. at 793, 429 S.E.2d at 163.
See O.C.G.A. § 23-2-53 (1982).

410.

207 Ga. App. at 793, 429 S.E.2d at 163.

411. 210 Ga. App. 650, 437 S.E.2d 360 (1993).
412. Id. at 651,437 S.E.2d at 362. See also Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 210 Ga.
App. 194, 435 S.E.2d 498 (1993) (jury question concerning fraudulent medical claims
submitted to insurance company). Other cases decided during this survey period in which
there was no issue offraud as a matter of law included: Boynton v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 207 Ga. App. 756, 429 S.E.2d 304 (1993) (no fraud concerning terms of insurance
policy in light of explicit provisions therein); Copeland v. Home Say. of Am., FA, 209 Ga.
App. 173, 433 S.E.2d 327 (X993) (no false representation by real estate agent concerning
flooding on creek-bordered property when plaintiff did nothing to investigate risk); Hicks
v. McLain Bldg. Materials, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 191, 433 S.E.2d 114 (1993) (sloppy business
practices in billing did not amount to actionable fraud); Crawford v. Odom, 211 Ga. App.
367,439 S.E.2d 27 (1993) (attorney's failure to give plaintiffs a copy of entire termite report
at closing was mere negligence rather than fraud).
413. See GEORGIA TORTs, supra note 9, § 32-3. See a/so Ben Farmer Realty Co. v.
Woodard, 212 Ga. App. 74, 441 S.E.2d 421 (1994).
414. See Toys W' Us, Inc. v. Atlanta Economic Dev. Corp., 195 Ga. App. 195,393 S.E.2d
44 (1990).
415. 208 Ga. App. 856, 432 S.E.2d 266 (1993).
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declined
to extend the application of this doctrine to the sale of farm
6
41

land.

G.

Torts Arising from Business Relations

Tortious Interference with Business Relations.
In establishing a cause of action for malicious (or tortious) interference with business relations, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that the
[defendant] (1) acted improperly and without privilege, (2) purposely
and with malice with the intent to injure, (3) induced a third party or
parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the
[plaintiff],
and (4) for which the [plaintiff] suffered some financial
417
injury.

This tort, therefore, does not lie against a party to the contract418 or
against a third party who merely asserts his own contractual rights." 9
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets. The supreme court held in
Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Laboratories, Inc.' that "trade secrets," for the
purpose of damages and injunctive relief under Georgia's Trade Secrets
Act,421 consist of actual customer lists and other such items that are
plaintiff's property.4' It does not, said the court, include knowledge
of such matters acquired by defendant during his employment by
plaintiff.4' If plaintiff wished to protect itself from competition by a
remedy
former employee based on that employee's knowledge, plaintiff's
424
was to obtain an enforceable covenant not to compete.
Defamation of Title. Georgia recognizes a tort cause of action for
defamation or slander of title to land, which consists of defendant's
making some false publication that results in damage to the value of

416. Id. at 858, 432 S.E.2d at 269.
417. Lake Tightsqueeze, Inc. v. Chrysler First Fin. Servs. Corp., 210 Ga. App. 178, 180,
435 S.E.2d 486, 488 (1993) (quoting Doll v. Grand Union Co., 925 F.2d 1363, 1371 (11th
Cir. 1991)).
418. See Professional Carpet Sys., Inc. v. Saefkow, 212 Ga. App. 131, 441 S.E.2d 98
(1994); Moore v. Barge, 210 Ga. App. 552, 436 S.E.2d 746 (1993).
419. See, e.g., Driggers v. Continental Grain Co., 210 Ga. App. 293, 435 S.E.2d 722
(1993); Russell Corp. v. BancBoston Fin. Co., 209 Ga. App. 660, 434 S.E.2d 716 (1993).
420. 263 Ga. 615, 437 S.E.2d 302 (1993).
421. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-760 (1994).
422. 263 Ga. at 620, 437 S.E.2d at 305.
423. Id.
424. Id.
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plaintiff's title.4 '
In South River Farms v. Bearden,42 defendants
filed an action seeking a money judgment against plaintiffs, but recorded
in connection therewith a notice of lis pendens against plaintiffs' property.427 Applying the rule that "[alt common law and under statutory
provisions lis pendens may not be predicated upon an action or suit
which seeks merely to recover a money judgment," the court of
appeals held plaintiffs' subsequent action for slander of title stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted.'
By contrast, in Alcovy
Properties,Inc. v. MTW Investment Co.,' the court of appeals upheld
the general rule that a properly filed lis pendens is privileged against a
defamation of title action." 1
VI. DAMAGES
During this survey period the Georgia Supreme Court was, once again,
faced with a constitutional challenge to one of its punitive damage
statutes. 2 The issue raised in Mack Rucks, Inc. v. Conkle " was
an equal protection challenge to the requirement that seventy-five
percent of a products liability punitive damage award must be rendered
to the state. 4 Citing public policy and the unfairness of a windfall to
a single plaintiff as necessary reasons for differing treatment of products
liability plaintiffs, the majority strained 5 to conclude that the statute

425. See Hicks v. McLain's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 191, 433 S.E.2d 114

(1993).
426. 210 Ga. App. 156, 435 S.E.2d 516 (1993).
427. Id. at 157, 435 S.E.2d at 517.
428. Id. at 157-58, 435 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting Watson v. Whatley, 218 Ga. 86, 88, 126
S.E.2d 621, 622 (1962)).
429. "Id. at 158, 435 S.E.2d at 518.
430. 212 Ga. App. 102, 441 S.E.2d 288 (1994).
431. Id. at 103, 441 S.E.2d at 289.
432. See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al., Torts, supra note 88, at 417-18.
433. 263 Ga. 539, 436 S.E.2d 635 (1993).
434. Id. at 53940,436 S.E.2d at 637. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(e) (Supp. 1994) provides in
part:
In a tort case in which the cause of action arises from product liability, there shall
be no limitation regarding the amount which may be awarded as punitive
damages. Only one award of punitive damages may be recovered in a court in this
state from a defendant for any act or omission if the cause of action arises from
product liability, regardless of the number of causes of action which may arise
from such act or omission .... Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded
under this subsection as punitive damages... shall be paid into the treasury of
the state ....
Id. at 543, 436 S.E.2d at 639.
435. For example, in support of their analysis the majority opined:
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in question passed constitutional muster."6 Justice Benham disagreed
with this opinion, and, in his well-reasoned dissent, noted in particular
that "by removing, or at least crippling, the financial incentive for
private citizens to pursue vigorously contested claims for punitive
damages, the punishment and deterrence purpose of punitive damages
is greatly hindered." 7
Finding the reasoning in MARTA v. Boswell," to be controlling, the
court of appeals in Hospital Authority v. Martin 9 held there can be
no award of punitive damages against a hospital authority created as a
governmental entity pursuant to the Georgia Hospital Authorities
Act."' The public policy proclaimed in Boswell, however, was deemed
inapplicable to public service corporations. The court of appeals in
Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Sheriff" 1 determined that these companies
were fair game for all punitive damage claims." 2
In Sightler v. Transus, Inc., 3 plaintiffs filed suit seeking punitive
damages against defendant truck driver and his employer for injuries
plaintiffs sustained when defendant driver's truck collided with a service
station. Defendant driver died before the case came to trial. Defendant
employer then sought to strike the punitive damages claim by urging
that since its liability was derivative and punitive damages could not be

[Tihe appellant is correct in its assertion that defendants in various tort actions
are treated differently, and the trial court was correct in its finding that the
statute treats plaintiffs in various tort actions differently. However, all similarly
situated plaintiffs and defendants including those in product liability action, are
treated equally by the statute.
Id. (emphasis in original).
436. Id. But see McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
437. 263 Ga. at 547, 436 S.E.2d at 642 (Benham, J. dissenting).
438. 261 Ga. 427, 405 S.E.2d 869 (1991). In that case the supreme court found that to
allow an award of punitive damages against MARTA, a governmental entity, would place
an unwarranted burden upon the public taxpayers. Id. at 428, 405 S.E.2d at 870.
439. 210 Ga. App. 893, 438 S.E.2d 103 (1993), affd, 1994 WL 652965 (Ga. Nov. 21,
1994).
440. 210 Ga. App. at 894-95, 438 SE.2d at 105. O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-70 et seq. (1991 &
Supp. 1994). See also Georgia Ports Auth. v. Hutchinson, 209 Ga. App. 726,434 S.E.2d 791
(1993) (punitive damages against the Georgia Ports Authority impermissible as a matter
of law).
441. 210 Ga. App. 299, 436 S.E.2d 14 (1993).
442. Id. at 301, 436 S.E.2d at 17-18. See also Rossee Oil Co. v. BellSouth Tel., Inc., 212
Ga. App. 235, 441 S.E.2d 464 (1994). Punitive damages may not, however, be assessed in
a nuisance action against a business when that business is in compliance with all
applicable state and federal environmental and safety regulations. See Stone Man, Inc. v.
Green, 263 Ga. 470, 435 S.E.2d 205 (1993).
443. 208 Ga. App. 173, 430 S.E.2d 81 (1993), cert. granted.
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assessed against the driver's estate,"" there no longer existed any
basis for punitive damages against it."5 Holding that an award of
punitive damages against the employer still would be viable if its agent's
conduct so warranted, 6 the court of appeals stated, "immunity from
punitive damages of [the driver's] estate, like other immunities agents
may enjoy, is a personal defense which depends on something other than
the nature of the agent's misconduct and does not insulate the principal
from liability for that misconduct."" 7 Clear and convincing evidence
is the statutory standard for the imposition of punitive damages." 8
When two different standards of proof applied for various issues in a
single case, the supreme court in Clarke v. Cotton 9 held it was error
for the trial court to fail to charge the definition of "clear and convincing
evidence" as it related to the punitive damages issue.'W
Determining that collateral source evidence may be admissible at trial
for limited impeachment purposes, the court of appeals in Patterson v.
51 overruled last year's survey period case of Hayes
Lauderback"
v. Gary

444. See Morris v. Duncan, 126 Ga. 467, 54 S.E. 1045 (1906); Cleveland v. Alford, 188
Ga. App. 690, 373 S.E.2d 853 (1988).
445. 208 Ga. App. at 173-74, 430 S.E.2d at 81.
446. Id. at 174, 430 S.E.2d at 81.
447. Id.
448. O.C.GA § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1994).
449. 263 Ga. 861, 440 S.E.2d 165 (1994).
450. Id. at 862,440 S.E.2d at 167. See Judge Dawson Jackson's concurring opinion for
a proposed charge definition of clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 863, 440 S.E.2d at 168
(K. Dawson Jackson, J., concurring). Other cases decided during this survey period that
considered evidentiary support of a punitive damages award included: Coker v. Culter, 208
Ga. App. 651, 431 S.E.2d 443 (1993) (evidence that defendant had been driving 40 m.p.h.
in a 35 m.p.h. zone during rainy weather and had a blood alcohol level of .03 did not reach
clear and convincing punitive damages standard); Troutman v. B.C.B. Co., 209 Ga. App.
166, 433 S.E.2d 73 (1993) (evidence of ten-year reputation for abusive behavior toward
women did not support punitive damages in a negligent hiring and retention action); Smith
v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 209 Ga. App. 826, 435 S.E.2d 54 (1993) (evidence that
company's payment scheme encouraged fast deliveries and one of its drivers hit plaintiff
twice from behind could support award of punitive damages); Rogers v. Carmike Cinemas,
Inc., 211 Ga. App. 427, 439 S.E.2d 663 (1993), cert.granted (daily sexual harassment by
three of defendant's employees that included sexual conversations, direct confrontations,
and offensive touching could support claim for punitive damages); Peters v. Hyatt Legal
Servs., 211 Ga. App. 587, 440 S.E.2d 222 (1993) (physical precedent only) (evidence that
law firm breached fiduciary duty to client by representing his former wife's interests in
divorce action could support punitive damages award).
In addition, the court of appeals in Ross v. Hagler, 209 Ga. App. 201, 433 S.E.2d 124
(1993), held that a lack of evidence in support of a punitive damage judgment does not
prohibit an award of attorney fees based on the showing of an intentional tort. Id. at 204,
433 S.E.2d at 127.
451. 211 Ga. App. 891, 440 S.E.2d 673 (1994).
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Burnett Trucking, Inc.,' which dealt with that same issue. In
Pattersonthe defense was properly allowed to cross examine decedent's
son concerning the availability of insurance coverage for medical bills
after the son testified about his mother's inability to pay for necessary
medical treatment.4m Even though Georgia's No-Fault Insurance
Act 4" has been repealed, the court of appeals in Walker v. Willis 5
held a defendant is still entitled to have a jury verdict reduced by the
amount of no-fault benefits received by the plaintiff."
Damages for fright, shock, and mental pain and suffering are
allowable in Georgia if such damages are associated with a physical
injury." Defendants in Monk v. Dial' claimed plaintiff's decedent
could not have experienced such injury since his death was instantaneous at the time of the collision. 9 Tb the contrary, the court of
appeals found there was evidence from which the jury could have
extrapolated the decedent was aware of the impending crash and
thereby experienced mental suffering.'
There is, the court opined,
"no requirement that the physical injury precede the mental pain and
suffering."' Additionally, the court of appeals in Windermere, Ltd. v.
Bettesc determined that when a complaint contains a provision for
bad faith attorney fees" and there is a prejudgment interest demand
letter'" which offers to settle all damages in a case, the amount of

452. 203 Ga. App. 693, 417 S.E.2d 676 (1992). See Cynthia Trimboli Adams, et al.,
Torts, supra note 23, at 457.
453. 211 Ga. App. at 892, 440 S.E.2d at 676. See also Moore v. Mellars, 208 Ga. App.
69, 430 S.E.2d 179 (1993). But see Carver v. Kinnett Snow, 209 Ga. App. 577, 434 S.E.2d
136 (1993) (testimony that plaintiffhad to go on food stamps as a result of accident did not
open door for impeachment by collateral source income since he qualified for food stamps
even with the receipt of such income).
454. O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-1 et seq. (repealed 1991). Former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-9 (repealed
1991) provided that an injured individual who was eligible for economic loss benefits under
the Act could not recover tort damages for such injuries to the extent of the available nofault benefits.
455. 210 Ga. App. 139, 435 S.E.2d 621 (1993).
456. 1o& at 140, 435 S.E.2d at 622-23. See also Johnson v. Loggins, 211 Ga. App. 265,
438 S.E.2d 711 (1993).
457. See OB-GYN Assocs. v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989); Candler v.
Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1934).
458. 212 Ga. App. 362, 441 S.E.2d 857 (1994).
459. Id. at 362, 441 S.E.2d at 859.
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prejudgment interest awarded also properly includes interest on the
attorney fees award.'
VII.

CONCLUSION

A law survey, like a Shakespearean drama, could not succeed without
the dedicated efforts of many who toil, unseen and unsung, behind the
scenes. In one of his more lighthearted moments, Professor Karl
Llewellyn, author of The Bramble Bush' and the Uniform Commercial Code,' among other things, penned the following lines, which
furnish' a fitting tribute to the efforts of our editors:
Song of the Law Review
Oh, I was a bright law student,
My grades were good and high,
They said I'd make the Law Review,
And now I'd like to die.
My eyes they burn, my head is dead,
But still I struggle through;
You ain't read half what I have read
7b do your work for you.
I have to read advance sheets
And show the faculty
The cases that they ought to read,
The points'they ought to see.
Both courts and scholars listen
When I tell them so and thus;
You'll find me cited now as 'Notes,"
Now as 'Anonymous.'
So workers of the Law School world,
While some strength still remains,
Arise, unite, demand a beer,
And slug 'em with your chains."
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